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Title: Essays on Development and Labor Economics
In chapter II and III of my dissertation I strive to understand the potential
that family policies have to enhance gender equality in paid and un-paid work in
low- and middle-income countries, by analyzing two distinct policies implemented
in Uruguay and Ecuador. First, I study a unique subsidy implemented in Uruguay
in 2014 that allows mothers to work half-time while receiving full-time pay for
four months after maternity leave ends. Utilizing eleven years of employment
survey data in a difference-in-differences and triple difference framework I find
an increase in the likelihood of employment in the short-run and possible increases
in employment in the middle-run driven by a higher portion of part-time work
arrangements. These findings indicate that policies easing the transition back from
maternity leave can increase female labor force participation and reduce “child-
iv
penalties” in the short and medium-run. Second, I find that paid paternity leave
of short duration is effective at increasing the time fathers spend childrearing
in the context of Ecuador. More fathers, as a results of the policy, reported
spending any time with their children, and the number of hours they report
childrearing increased by 20%, up to 4 years after the end of paternity leave
benefits. Interestingly, the leave does not lead to changes in employment, number
of hours of paid work, or participation in other types of housework, which implies
a substitution away from leisure and into time childrearing. Lastly, in chapter IV,
my co-authors and I developed a randomized control trial to study the effects of
financial inclusion in rural communities in Uganda. In this study existing savings
groups (informal finance institutions) gained access to formal group loans from
a commercial bank. We show that the bank loan stimulated an immediate and
sizable increase in internal lending, which is sustained over time. As a result,
members of treated groups had temporarily lower rates of food insecurity, and
point estimates suggest sizable increases in income and microenterprise size (which
are not statistically significant). However, groups assigned to loans experienced
significantly more turnover, suggesting that the possibility of external financing
generates powerful selection effects.
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My dissertation is motivated by the facts that globally women are paid
approximately 20 percent less than men, they suffer larger incidences of poverty,
and, when we account for their unpaid and paid labor, they spend significantly
more than time working than men (International Labor Organization, 2019).
To decrease these egregious inequalities requires not only a cultural change, but
policies and programs that put the experience of women at the center, increasing
their access to financial products, promoting the reconciliation of work and family,
and fostering egalitarian values of household responsibilities among men. In
chapter II and III of my dissertation I strive to understand the potential that
family policies have to enhance gender equality in paid and un-paid work in low-
and middle-income countries, by analyzing two distinct policies implemented in
Uruguay and Ecuador. Lastly, in chapter 3, co-authored with Alfredo Burlando
and Jessica Goldberg, we study the effects of increased financial inclusion on the
wellbeing of members of saving groups in rural communities in Uganda, who are
mostly women.
In chapter II, I study a unique parental care subsidy implemented in
Uruguay that allows parents to work half-time time while receiving full-time pay
to care for a newborn. Even though this subsidy is gender neutral, in practice,
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98% of beneficiaries are women. This policy allows for a more gradual return to
work after maternity leave which in turn might increase labor force participation
and job retention in the short-run for mothers with a young child (Schott, 2012).
Using nationally representative survey data, I analyze how this policy affects
female employment and income. In a difference-in-differences and triple differences
specification, I compare mothers exposed to the policy (treatment group) to
ineligible mothers and fathers married to ineligible mothers (control group).
I find that mothers exposed to the policy are more likely to be employed
following the implementation of the parental care subsidy in the short and
medium-term. I find an increase in the likelihood of employment of 17% for
eligible mothers up to 1 year after childbirth, and a decrease in hours worked
of 5% without a significant reduction in income up to 3 years after childbirth.
These findings demonstrate that policies easing the transition back from maternity
leave can increase female labor force participation and reduce “child-penalties”
in the short and medium-run. This is the first paper to evaluate a parental leave
policy with the work half-time, receive full-time pay characteristics. Understanding
the effects of this unique approach provides new insights and can inform policy
discussions and innovation.
The influence of parental leave policies goes beyond female employment.
Family policies directly impact the quantity and quality of early childhood
investments. In chapter III, I examine how the implementation of 15 days of
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paid paternity leave in Ecuador affects paternal involvement in childrearing,
housework, and labor market outcomes. Even though this policy provides just a
few days of leave, the special timing of these days could set a precedent for the
family dynamics and task divisions in the household that otherwise would be
determined by traditional gender norms. If fathers are present during the hospital
stay and early days at home, it is possible they will begin domestic routines that
will continue to influence child rearing well after paternal leave has expired. Using
data from the Ecuadorian National Employment Survey (2007-2013) I employ a
difference-in-differences (DD) design that compares fathers of children born after
2009, to fathers of children born before 2009, who are employed in the formal
sector (treated), versus informal sector (not treated).
I estimate that fathers eligible for PPL increase time with their children by
24 minutes per week on average. This is an increase of 20 % from an average of
2 hours per week before the implementation of PPL. Fathers who, pre-treatment,
spend the least amount of time childrearing exhibit the largest gain. I find that
paternity leave increases active fathering because fathers establish routines during
the initial parenting experience. These early routines are “sticky” and have
lasting effects on paternal behavior—a key factor to achieve gender equality in the
home. Interestingly, the leave does not lead to changes in employment, number of
hours of paid work, or participation in other types of housework, which implies a
substitution away from leisure and into time childrearing. This paper complements
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the nascent body of literature on the effects of parental leave reserved for fathers
by analyzing PPL of short duration in a non-OECD country which complements
the existing studies focused on high income countries which offer more generous
parental leave provisions.
The broad goal of the first 2 chapters is to shed light on the importance
of family economics for the design of government programs—a perspective
that is critical to inform optimal policy design, and that may have important
consequences for family wellbeing.
Lastly, in chapter IV, my co-authors and I developed a randomized control
trial (RCT) to study the effects of financial inclusion in rural communities in
Uganda. In this RCT, existing savings groups (informal, community-based finance
institutions) gained facilitated access to formal group loans from a commercial
bank in Uganda. We show that the bank loan stimulated an immediate and
sizable increase in internal lending. As a result, members of treated groups
had temporarily lower rates of food insecurity. Point estimates suggest sizable
increases in income and microenterprise size. However, savings groups assigned to
treatment experienced significantly more turnover, driven by groups with low levels
of cohesion. This project has important implications for banking institutions in
the developing world, mainly that working with, rather than replacing, informal
financial institutions may provide a more stable venue for providing credit to new
communities. For development agencies, it suggests both an opportunity and
4
a cautionary tale. While lifting credit constraints by providing formal credit to
existing saving groups can help them scale up, it may generate powerful selection
effects with negative externalities on the community that need to be addressed as
part of an intervention.
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CHAPTER II
WORK HALF-TIME, RECEIVE FULL-TIME PAY: EFFECT OF A NOVEL
FAMILY POLICY ON FEMALE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES
Introduction
While the participation of women in the labor force has increased steadily
over the past decades, gender inequalities in the labor market remain substantial
(Blau & Kahn, 2017; Goldin, 2006). Significant gender differences in wages,
hours of work, and occupational choices continue to exist in the vast majority
of countries. Globally, women are paid approximately 20 percent less than men,
and this gap is largest in low-income countries (International Labor Organization,
2019). This differential cannot be explained solely by gender differences in
schooling, number of hours worked, experience, and job characteristics (Blau &
Kahn, 2017; Kleven et al., 2018).
These gender differences start or are expanded when a child is born; the
so called “child penalties” refer to the reduction of women’s income observed
immediately after childbirth that persists for years (Bertrand et al., 2010; Goldin,
2014a; Kleven & Landais, 2017; Kleven et al., 2018). Often, women work part-
time while simultaneously being the main providers of child care within the
family (Paull, 2008; Ciccia & Verloo, 2012). Recognizing that childbirth is a key
moment in the life of workers, countries around the world have invested significant
6
resources in maternity leave and other types of family policies to increase female
labor force attachment, improve gender equality, and foster family wellbeing.
However, women still experience larger child penalties than men. Even with
maternity leave policies in place, women often do not return to their job after
maternity leave, and studies show mixed results about how effective extending
maternity leave is at improving female empowerment in the long-run (Bailey et al.,
2019).
In this paper I study the introduction of a novel form of family policy
implemented in Uruguay in 2014: A subsidy that allows parents to work half-
time while receiving full-time pay, from the time maternity leave ends, and until
the child is 6 month old. The argument for this new form of family policy is that
a more gradual return to work after maternity leave might increase labor force
attachment and job retention in the short-run for mothers with a young child
(Schott, 2012). The hypothesized mechanism to yield these results is increased
flexibility, which allows mothers to retain work related human capital that they
would otherwise lose on full maternity leave. However, if this subsidy fosters
traditional gender divisions of household work it could encourage women’s part-
time work and lower the probability of upward occupational moves increasing
gender wage gaps (Blau & Kahn, 2013; Evertsson & Duvander, 2011). Hence the
importance to study empirically its effects in the short and medium-run.
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I examine the effect of the parental care subsidy on female labor market
outcomes using household survey data in a difference-in-differences (DD) and triple
difference (DDD) framework. My identification strategy relies on the facts that
only workers employed in the formal-private sector are eligible, and that utilization
consists almost entirely of women. Women employed in the public and informal
sectors as well as men whose spouse does not work or is employed informally, are
not eligible or affected by the policy, and can serve as control groups.
I find that mothers are more likely to be employed following the
implementation of the parental care subsidy in the short and medium-run.
Mothers are 6.1 percent more likely to be employed during the first year of their
child from a pre-treatment mean of 54 percent. This effect is driven by an increase
in the likelihood of being employed in the formal-private sector, which increased
by 17 percent from a pre-treatment mean of 26 percent. Moreover, I find evidence
that this effect is heterogeneous and largest for disadvantaged mothers (those who
are less educated).
Next, I study the effect that parental care subsidy has on the intensive
margin by looking at income, job experience, and number of jobs, conditional on
employment. For this, I leverage the fact that public sector workers and informal
workers do not have access to the new subsidy and can therefore serve as a control
group within the sample of employed mothers of infants. I find a large increase in
subsidies received from the government, consistent with program take-up, with no
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significant changes in total income for mothers of infants employed in the formal-
private sector after the implementation of the policy.
In the medium-run, 1 to 3 years after the birth of a child, I find an increase
in the likelihood of employment for mothers. Moreover, mothers of a young child
born after the implementation of the policy and employed in the formal-private
sector decreased their hours worked by 5% without a significant decrease in
income.
Overall, this study provides novel evidence that extensions of flexibilities
after birth in the form of fully paid half-time employment causes higher labor
force attachment for female workers in the short and medium-run, especially for
disadvantaged mothers (those with lower levels of education). The results are
robust to changes in the specification and to an extended “event–study” analysis
which allows for visualization of pre-treatment trends as well as the evolution of
the average treatment effect in the post period.
My paper contributes to the literature on family policies in several ways.
This is the first paper to evaluate a parental leave policy with the work half-time,
receive full-time pay characteristics. Understanding the effects of this unique
approach provides new insights and informs policy discussions and innovation.
Second, I expand the literature by providing the first analysis of a family policy
implemented in a non-OECD country. I leverage differences between formal
and informal employment and show that the parental care subsidy is effective at
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increasing formal employment among mothers of infants. Third, I provide a causal
examination of the short and medium-run effects of the parental care subsidy on
female labor market outcomes. This complements studies that focus on take-up
determinants and short-run effects of parental leave (Bartel et al., 2018; Romero-
Balsas, 2012; Tanaka & Waldfogel, 2007).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides background on existing
family policies in Uruguay, and the policy reform. Section 2.3 describes the data.
Section 2.4 details the empirical methods used. Section 2.5 presents short and
medium-term results in the extensive and intensive margin. Section 2.6 shows
robustness checks, and section 2.7 concludes.
Background
In this section I describe the institutional background of Uruguay, the novel
parental care subsidy and the main characteristics of maternity and paternity leave
provisions that also exist in the country. I briefly outline the history and current
state of leave policies across countries and review the literature on the effects
of paid family leave, child penalties, and half-time work for mothers of young
children.
Parental care subsidy
The two most common types of family policies designed to balance work and
child care are the provision of child-care services and the provision of leave for
10
parents around the time of childbirth to care for an infant child. In this paper I
focus on a novel family policy that has characteristics of both common provisions
but is not easily classified as either child-care or leave.
In November of 2013 Uruguay passed a law regulating a novel parental
care subsidy for workers in the private sector. Under this new policy, mothers
and fathers have access to full-time pay while working half-time from the time
maternity leave ends until the child is 6 month old, which in most cases amounts
to 4 months of benefits. This half-time period is job-protected and parents can
decide whether the mother, father or both (alternating) will receive the subsidy.1
Beneficiaries receive monthly transfers from the social security authority equivalent
to their salary for the reduced hours.
The parental care subsidy was implemented in January 2014 and the
introduction was gradual. At the onset, the subsidy covered from the end of
maternity leave until the child was 4 months old. In January of 2015 the subsidy
was extended to cover until the child was 5 months old. Since 2016 the subsidy
covers until the child is 6 months old. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of take up
for maternity, paternity and parental care subsidy provisions for workers in the
private sector. Take-up was expanded as the coverage of parental care subsidy
increased from 2014 to 2016. The average number of beneficiaries in 2014 was
738 and increased to 1327 in 2015 and for the period 2016-2019 it reached 2200.
1In the literature “job-protected” refers to strong regulations that protect parent against
discrimination or retaliation for taking up paid leave. In practice it means that employers cannot
fire or change working conditions during and immediately after the parental care subsidy.
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Maternity and paternity leave had an average number of beneficiaries per month in
2019 of 1125 and 1113 respectively.
FIGURE 1.
Number of beneficiaries
Notes: Aggregated data from program utilization
published by BPS. Number of beneficiaries per month
by type of subsidy.
Even though both mothers and fathers can alternate access to the parental
care subsidy, in practice, approximately 98 percent of beneficiaries at any given
month are women. Figure 2 presents the evolution of the number of beneficiaries
by gender. This extreme gender gap in utilization has also been documented in
the literature regarding gender-neutral family leave policies in other countries.
Additionally, only dual earner families are eligible. For the mother or father to
apply for the subsidy, the mother needs to have taken maternity leave. If the
father is employed in the private sector but his wife is not employed or employed
informally, he is not eligible for the parental care subsidy.
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FIGURE 2.
Parental care subsidy by gender of beneficiary
Notes: Aggregated data from program utilization
published by BPS. Number of beneficiaries of parental
care subsidy per month by gender.
The parental care subsidy is fundamentally different than maternity leave
because the benefits are conditional on returning to work after maternity leave
ends and staying employed until the end of the benefits. The parental care subsidy
changes the budget constraint that the mother faces at the time of returning
from maternity leave. Figure 3 illustrates the new labor-leisure choice. With
the subsidy, the budget constraint now has a kink. Mothers working half-time
receive full-time pay which puts them at a higher indifference curve. If we only
consider the income-leisure choice and assume indifference curves do not change
with the birth of a child, we should see large take up of the subsidy and increased
labor force attachment during the first months of life of the infant. However, the
prediction is less clear in the long-run.
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FIGURE 3.
Labor-leisure choice with new budget constraint
Maternity and paternity leave in Uruguay
In addition of the parental care subsidy family policies in Uruguay include
maternity leave and paternity leave. The details of each program as well as when
they where implemented varies according to the sector of employment. Public and
private workers are subject to different regulations.
Maternity leave for workers in the private sector was implemented in 1980
and consisted of 12 job-protected, fully-paid weeks. In January 2014 workers’
rights in the private sector were expanded in magnitude and coverage.2 Maternity
leave was extended by 2 weeks and included non-dependent workers covered by the
social security authority with up to one employee, single-tax workers and workers
covered by unemployment insurance. Maternity leave starts 6 weeks before the
scheduled day of the birth and ends 8 weeks after. Public sector female workers
2Law 19,161 of 2013 replaced the benefits regulated by Law 15,084 of 1980.
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have similar benefits, since 1990 they can access maternity leave for 13 weeks
that start one week before the estimated birth date of the child. After maternity
leave ends workers that are breastfeeding have the right to work half-time while
receiving full-time pay until the child is 1 year old maximum.3 Male public workers
have the right to paternity leave for 10 working days from the date of the birth
of the child. These policies provide 100 percent of wage replacement paid by the
employer (in this case the government). 4
Paternity leave was introduced gradually from January 2014, and since
January 2016 it consists of 13 working days. It includes workers on private and
public activity, non-dependents covered by social security with up to one employee
and personal contractors who are up to date with the contributions and are not
delinquent on alimony payments. In both cases, the social security system provides
100 percent wage replacement during the leave.5
Literature on part-time work and the effects of maternity leave
Recent work highlights the importance of parenthood for the persistence of
gender inequality in labor market outcomes. Kleven, et al. (2019, May) show that,
in the U.S., U.K., Scandinavian countries, Austria, and Germany, the earnings of
3The worker is required to provide a medical certification of breastfeeding to the employer
during the duration of the subsidy.
4Law 19,121 of 2013 replaced the benefits regulated by Law 16,104 of 1990.
5Same-sex couples have access to same level of leave, the gestational parent receives maternity
leave, while the non-gestational parent receives paternity leave. Public and private workers who
adopt a child also have the right to paid leave for 6 weeks, followed by 6 months of half-time
work while receiving full-time pay
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men and women evolve similarly before parenthood—after adjusting for life cycle
and time trends—but diverge sharply after parenthood. Women experience a large,
immediate and persistent drop in earnings after the birth of their first child, while
men are essentially unaffected. In general, the so called child penalty in earnings
can come from three margins: The extensive margin of labor supply (employment),
the intensive margin of labor supply (hours worked), and the wage rate. Goldin
(2014) argues that the gender earnings gap persists because mothers of infants
are more likely to select into flexible jobs and these work-life balance preferences
interact with sector-specific long-hours premium.
Family policies, especially maternity leave, are important because they are
seen as a potential instruments to decrease the earning gender gap by increasing
female labor force attachment after childbirth. However, maternity leave also has
the potential to increase the likelihood of mothers selecting into more flexible jobs
with lower wage rates.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) guidelines propose the extension
of maternity leave to 18 weeks with a benefit equivalent to 100 percent of earnings.
Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix plot current maternity and paternity
leave regulations across countries. Almost all OECD countries achieve ILO’s
recommendation: the average number of weeks of paid maternity leave is 18.
However, only 13 percent of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean meet
ILO’s guidance on maternity leave. Given these differences in the length and
16
coverage of leave provisions in low and middle-income countries it is important
to study policies that extend flexibilities for workers but are less costly than fully
paid maternity leave for governments to implement. Hence the importance of
studying the labor market effects of the novel subsidy in the short and middle-
term for women.
An extensive literature examines the labor market effects of parental leave
policies in high-income countries. Rossin-Slater (2017) provides a review of the
literature on the impacts on women and children of the wide variety of family
leave policies across Europe and North America. She concludes that parental leave
shorter than one year can improve women’s job continuity, while longer leave may
negatively impact career advancement.
More recently, Stearns (2018) finds that different components of parental
leave laws in Great Britain had opposing effects. Whereas wage replacement
tended to increase short-term employment, laws granting job protection and
increasing leave duration tended to impact career advancement negatively in the
longer-term. One possible explanation for these findings is that while paid family
leave policies may increase labor-force participation in the short-term, they could
also increase statistical discrimination and occupational segregation in the longer
term. Women in OECD countries who have more generous paid leave are more
likely to work part-time and less likely to hold management positions (Blau and
Kahn, 2013).
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The evidence of the effects of parental leave on low and middle-income
countries is limited. Albagli and Rau (2018) study an extension of maternity leave
from 12 to 24 weeks in Chile (also an OECD country) utilizing a linear model.
They find an increase in the probability of employment of 5.8 percentage points
one year after birth, but do not find effects on wages.
I expand on this literature not only by studying a novel policy but also by
considering employment by sectors. Increasing formal employment is a mayor
policy goal in low and middle-income countries. Formal jobs are of better quality,
provide higher wages and operate within the labor regulations of the country.
Increasing access and continuity of formal employment for women is specially
relevant to decrease gender wage gaps in resource-constraint households.
Data
The household and individual level data used in this study come from
Uruguay’s Continuous Household Survey (ECH), for the years 2009-2019. ECH
is a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey, conducted monthly
by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). Each individual in the household is
questioned about their demographic characteristics, employment status, sector of
employment, and non-labor income.
The data contain information that is crucial for the identification strategy.
First, ECH allows me to identify the composition of the household and using the
age of the children I can identify parents of infants (a child younger than one year
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old). Second, it allows me to identify formal versus informal workers by asking
individuals whether they make contributions towards their pensions to the social
security authority (BPS). I use this question, following the literature, to classify
formal versus informal workers in the private sector.6
There are two primary limitations to using ECH data. First, ECH lacks of
precise information on child birth dates, only reporting the age of the individuals
in years. As a result, to identify short term effects as well as evidence of program
utilization I focus on women with a child that is less than one year old. Second,
the survey only asks the number of hours worked normally, and it does not refer to
a specific reference week. Thus, even if a parent is working half-time during the
length of the subsidy they might still report the otherwise full-time job hours.
Because of this, I cannot distinguish the number of hours worked during the
subsidy from the number of hours that the person would have worked otherwise.
I examine labor market outcomes for women with infants by comparing their
experiences to those of men that are at a similar stage of life and career but that
are not directly or indirectly treated by the new subsidy. Given the extremely
low take-up of this program among men (on average lower than 2%) it is unlikely
they will be directly affected by the program. However, if their spouses utilize
the subsidy many intra-household dynamics might change which in turn will
6The formal sector is defined as the group of employed individuals who work for companies
that are registered with the tax authority and pay taxes towards social security. The informal
sector is formed by employed individuals working for unregistered employers or that do not pay
taxes to the social security authority. Public sector workers are in large majority formal workers.
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also affect men. To avoid these indirect effects in the control group, I select men
whose spouses are not eligible for the parental care subsidy. This consists of men
whose spouses are not employed or are employed informally and thus have not
experienced any change in benefits.
The sample that I use to conduct the analysis consists of mothers 18 to 45
years old with an infant child at the time of the survey (treatment group); and
men 18 to 45 years old, father of an infant at the time of the survey whose spouse
or partner is not employed or is employed informally (control group). Table 1
shows the mean and standard deviation of employment, income and hours worked
and individual characteristics for treatment and control groups, before and after
the implementation of the parental care subsidy in January 2014.
There is a large employment gap between mothers and untreated fathers
of infants. Only 54 percent of mothers of infants are employed before the
implementation of the policy, whereas 92 percent of fathers of infants are employed
during this period. Interestingly, conditional on employment, total labor income is
less unequal between the two groups. Before January of 2014 mothers and fathers
of infants earned on average UY$ 14200 and UY$ 15300 in total labor income
respectively. However, during the post-treatment period the total labor income






Pre-January 2014 Post-January 2014 Pre-January 2014 Post-January 2014
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Employment
Employed 0.92 0.27 0.89 0.32 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.50
Formal 0.62 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.45 0.50
Formal-Private 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47
Public 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31
Informal 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.31
Inactive-Housework 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46
Panel B: Income and Hours Worked
Income from subsidies 60 814 92 1230 1277 6955 3761 18564
Income from employer 15056 15343 25393 24075 12026 16177 21647 21024
Total labor income 15368 15327 25937 24194 14235 17015 27141 26848
Hours worked 45.46 14.32 42.61 13.65 33.40 15.01 32.41 13.92
Job experience (years) 4.20 5.46 4.18 5.18 4.28 4.56 4.71 4.34
Number of jobs 1.10 0.34 .07 0.29 1.12 0.39 1.13 0.42
Panel C: Individual Characteristics
Number of children 2.50 1.53 2.32 1.35 2.32 1.45 2.13 1.24
Age 29.77 7.36 29.67 7.49 29.18 7.07 29.61 6.98
Married 0.84 0.37 0.85 0.36 0.75 0.43 0.78 0.41
Ed: Primary 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46
Ed: Middle 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.44
Ed: Secondary 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.41 0.49
Capital city 0.35 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.48
Sample size 3876 3477 8008 7797
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for mothers of infants (treatment group), and untreated fathers of infants (control group) before
and after January 2014, when the parental care subsidy was implemented. Labor market outcomes are dummy variables. Formal is not equal
to Formal-Private plus Public because neither category includes entrepreneurs with more than one worker who are registered with the social
security authority but are not eligible to receive the parental care subsidy.
Mothers and untreated fathers have similar number of children and ages.
However, mothers of infants are less likely to be married or living with her partner,
have higher levels of education, and are more likely to live in the capital city
than untreated fathers of infants. I control for these differences in individual
characteristics in my identification.
Empirical strategy
Employment effects in the short-run
I study the effect of an extension of family policies on female labor force
attachment by leveraging the quasi-experiment provided by the implementation
of a parental care subsidy in Uruguay in January of 2014. I employ a difference-
in-difference (DD) design that compares mothers of infants, to untreated father
of infants (as defined in section 3), before and after the implementation of the
parental care subsidy.
To understand the effect of the policy on the employment decision of mothers
of infants, I estimate the following generalized DD equation:
Yit = β1Womani ∗ Aftert + γ′Xit + δi + θt + ϵit (2.1)
where i is an individual and t represents a month-year. Yit is the outcome of
interest. This binary variable takes the value of one if individual i is employed
in the formal-private sector at time t. Womani is a binary variable that takes
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the value of one if individual i is a mother, and zero for fathers. Aftert is a
binary variable that take the value of one for periods after December of 2013,
and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest is β1 and it captures the effect of
the parental care subsidy on employment among mothers of infants. The vector
Xit includes a set of individual and household controls such as individual’s age,
education, marital status, ethnicity, number of children in the household, and
region. Gender fixed effects (mother or father) are captured by δi and control
for any characteristics that are common to each gender and do not change over
time. Time fixed effects are captured by θt and control for shocks that might affect
labor market outcomes and are common to all individuals, such as an economic
recessions in the country. Standard errors are clustered by month-year to allow
for correlation within time periods and provide standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
To interpret the estimated β1 coefficient as the causal effect of the subsidy on
employment, it needs to be true that in the absence of the parental care subsidy
the control group (untreated fathers of infants) would have had similar trends
(but not necessarily level) to the treated group (mothers of infants), and that
no other factors affecting labor market outcomes occurred at the same time as
the implementation of this new policy. To explore the validity of the design, I
extend the DD analysis to an “event-study” analysis. In practice, this means
estimating equation (2.1) with year effects interacted with the treatment indicator.
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I then plot the treatment effect by year, which allows for visualization of pre-
treatment trends and the evolution of the average treatment effect in the post
period. Results are included in section 6.
Labor hours and income effects in the short-run
Next, I study the effect that the parental care subsidy has on the intensive
margin by looking at hours worked, labor income, total income, job experience,
and number of jobs, conditional on employment. For this analysis I restrict
the sample to all employed fathers and mothers of infants and employ a triple
difference (DDD) design. The first difference compares these outcomes across
time (before and after the implementation of the policy), the second difference
compares mothers to fathers of infants, and the third difference refers to the sector
of employment. In this third difference, I take advantage of the fact that public
sector workers as well as informal workers do not have access to this subsidy and
thus can serve as a control group within the sample of employed mothers of an
infant. This strategy controls for any possible differential trends across sectors of
employment that affect all of its workers.
This DDD approach allows me to study the effect of the policy on the
intensive margin of work by comparing mothers of infants to fathers of infants,
employed in the private sector (treated) versus public and informal sector
(control), before and after the parental care subsidy was implemented. Specifically,
I estimate the following DDD equation:
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Yist =β1Aftert ∗Womani ∗ Privateis + β2Aftert ∗ Privateis+
β3Womani ∗ Aftert + β4Womani ∗ Privateis+
γ′Xit + δi + θt + ηs + ϵit
(2.2)
where Privateis is a binary variable that takes the value of one if individual i
works formally in the private sector and zero otherwise, and ηs is a sector (private,
public, and informal) fixed effect. The rest of the variables and parameters are
as defined in equation (2.1). The main parameter of interest is β1 (the triple-
difference estimate), and β2, β3, and β4 are the estimates of the double interaction
terms. Standard errors are clustered at the month-year level.
Medium-run effects on labor market outcomes
To understand whether the parental care subsidy’s effects are persistent, I
focus on the labor market outcomes of mothers whose youngest child is aged 1 to
3 years old. These women are not currently exposed to the subsidy, but depending
on when their children were born, could have been exposed to the subsidy in the
past. At this point one data restriction deserves mention. The ECH does not allow
me to directly identify women affected by the program, because I do not observe
individuals history of employment and thus I do not know whether the mothers in
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the sample were employed around the time of childbirth, therefore, I estimate ITT
effects.
To study the medium term effects of the policy on employment, I use a DD
design that compares mothers of young children (1 to 3 years old) to untreated
fathers of young children, that were born after 2013 (exposed to the subsidy),
versus before 2013.
Yit = β1Womani ∗ Postt + γ′Xit + δi + θt + ϵit (2.3)
where Postt is a binary variable that takes the value of one if individual i has
a child born after 2013, and zero otherwise. In addition to all the controls included
in equation (2.1), Xit includes fixed effects for the year of birth and age of the
youngest child of individual i. These additional fixed effects allow me to compare
across individuals whose youngest child has the same age and was born in the
same year. The rest of the variables and parameters are as specified in equation
(2.1). The coefficient of interest is β1, it captures the medium-run effect of the
parental care subsidy on employment among mothers of infants.
In a similar fashion, I estimate the medium-run effect of the parental care
subsidy on hours worked and income using a DDD approach. I compare mothers
of young children to fathers of young children, employed in the private sector
(treated) versus public and informal sector (control), whose youngest child was
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born before and after the parental care subsidy was implemented. Specifically, I
estimate the following DDD equation:
Yist =β1Postt ∗Womani ∗ Privateis + β2Privateis ∗ Postt+
β3Womani ∗ Postt + β4Womani ∗ Privateis+
γ′Xit + δi + δt + ηs + ϵist
(2.4)
All variables and parameters have the same meaning as above. The main
parameter of interest is β1 (the triple-difference estimate) and it indicates the
medium-run causal effects of the parental care benefit on the intensive margin
of work (hours worked and income).
Since both, the DD and DDD methods (equations (2.1) and (2.3); and
equations (2.2) and (2.4)) leverage variation in the exposure to the subsidy
rather than actual take-up, I estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) which is preferable
to estimates of treatment on the treated (TOT) for several reasons.7 First, TOT
estimates could be subject to the same bias from selection into treatment that
cross-sectional studies have been criticized for. Second, from a policy-making
perspective ITT effects may be more relevant as they allow for feedback effects,
whereby the new subsidy could have changed expectations and norms beyond the
7ITT refers to the average effect of the policy on everyone exposed to it regardless of whether
they where treated, whereas TOT refers to the average effect of the policy for those that where
actually treated by it. In this case TOT would represent the effect of parental care subsidy for
those mothers that reduced hours worked to four or less per week by receiving the parental care
subsidy.
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effects of actually using the half-time option. The implementation of this new form
of family policies sent a strong public message about the importance of parental
involvement in child-rearing which may have incentivized mothers (and potentially
also fathers) who were exposed to the policy but not treated to nevertheless be
more involved in the home. However, it is safe to assume that feedback effects on
parents who were exposed but not treated are smaller than the first-order-effects
on parents who reduced hours of work, such that the ITT results presented here
underestimate the true causal effect of parental care subsidy on those who take it.
Results
Short-run effects on maternal labor market outcomes
Table 2 presents regression results from equation (2.1) where the dependent
variable is an indicator of employment by sector. Overall, I find a statistically
significant increase in the likelihood of a mother of an infant being employed
following the implementation of the parental care subsidy. The ITT effect is 3.3
percentage points. The magnitude of the estimated effect is considerable. Pre-
program employment for the treatment group averages 54 percent. Relative to this




Short-term effects of parental care subsidy on employment
Dependent variable:
Employed Formal Formal-Private Public Informal “Stay-at-home”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman*After 0.033∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ −0.004 0.006
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Mean 0.54 0.4 0.26 0.09 0.07 0.31
Time FE X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X
Observations 23,158 23,158 23,158 23,158 23,158 23,158
R2 0.254 0.227 0.095 0.086 0.051 0.199
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.222 0.089 0.080 0.044 0.193
Residual Std. Error 0.411 0.441 0.452 0.280 0.265 0.368
Notes: This table contains regression estimates where the treated group consists of all mothers of infants and the control
group are untreated fathers of infants (whose wife is unemployed, or employed informally). Each column reports a
different regression where the outcome variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual is
employed (1), employed in a specific sector (2-5), or a “stay-at-home” parent. Individual controls include: Age, number
of children, education dummies, marital status dummies, region dummies, and ethnicity dummies. Standard errors are
clustered at the year-month level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
As described in section 2.2, I can distinguish 3 distinct sectors in the labor
market of low and middle income countries: Formal-public, formal-private, and
informal sectors. The increase in employment among mothers of infants is driven
by an increase in employment in the formal sector as shown by column 2. I then
further desegregate this effect by looking at private and public employment.
The likelihood of being employed in the private sector increased by 17 percent
from a pre-treatment mean of 26 percent. This is to be expected because the
private-formal sector is the one that was treated. Column 4 also indicates a strong
increase in the likelihood of being employed in the public sector of 24 percent
from a pre-treatment mean of 9 percent. However, I show in the robustness
section that employment in the public sector does not satisfy the underlying
identifying assumption of parallel trends, making this result likely bias. Columns
5 and 6 show there are no significant changes in the likelihood of being employed
informally or being a “stay-at-home” mom as a result of the policy.
Table 3 presents regression results from equation (2.2) where the sample
is restricted to employed mothers and fathers of infants. After*Woman*Private
captures the effect of parental care subsidy on the outcome variables among
mothers of infants employed in the private sector. Subsidies are the self-reported
amount in transfers received from the social security authority related to medical
and maternity subsidies (including the parental care subsidy). If there is take
up we should see an increase in subsidies and a decrease in income received from
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the employer. Indeed, women employed in the private sector experience a large
and statistically significant increase in transfers. The amount of these specific
transfers increased by UY$3,819 which represents a 166 percent increase from
a pre-treatment mean of UY$2,220. The increase in subsidies is equivalent to
29.5 percent of the average pre-treatment salaries. The increase in subsidies
is accompanied by a slightly larger decrease in salaries received from employer
of UY$5,300 a 40 percent decrease from a pre-treatment mean of UY$12,927.
The increase in subsidies balanced with a decrease in income received from
the employer produced an statistically insignificant decrease in total income of
UY$1,890, a 12 percent increase from a pre-treatment mean of UY$15,503.8
Hours worked refers to the self-reported number of hours worked in a
standard week, it does not refer to the number of hours in a reference week. Thus,
even if women are working half-time during the length of the subsidy they might
still report the otherwise full-time job hours. Because of this I cannot distinguish
the number of hours worked during the subsidy from the number of hours that the
person would have worked otherwise. Keeping this caveat in mind, the parental
care subsidy had an small but statistically significant negative effect on hours
worked of 2 hours and 21 minutes per week from a pre-treatment mean of 37 hours
and 40 minutes.





Short-term effects of parental care subsidy, DDD estimates
Dependent variable:
Subsidies Labor income Total income Hrs. worked Experience N. of jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After*Private 168.430∗∗ 5,195.807∗∗∗ 5,235.082∗∗∗ 2.030∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(71.580) (903.959) (920.647) (0.687) (0.225) (0.014)
After*Woman 39.858 720.900 1,545.727∗∗ 2.404∗∗∗ 0.040 0.008
(159.679) (785.143) (784.051) (0.701) (0.243) (0.015)
Woman*Private 1,967.170∗∗∗ −2,082.215∗∗∗ −510.868 3.998∗∗∗ 1.431∗∗∗ −0.028∗
(213.325) (726.986) (736.521) (0.642) (0.194) (0.014)
After*Woman 3,819.157∗∗∗ −5,300.101∗∗∗ −1,715.908 −2.346∗∗∗ 0.088 0.015
*Private (701.963) (1,126.570) (1,269.810) (0.847) (0.267) (0.020)
Mean 2220.84 12927.48 15950.34 37.7 4.14 1.1
Time FE X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X
Observations 15,254 15,254 15,254 15,254 15,254 15,254
R2 0.062 0.299 0.268 0.241 0.266 0.052
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.292 0.261 0.234 0.259 0.043
Residual Std. Error 10,386.520 16,775.590 19,111.710 13.443 4.186 0.359
Notes: This table contains regression estimates where the treated group consists of mothers of infants employed in the formal-private sector and the control group
are mothers of infants employed informally or in the public sector and employed fathers of infants. Each column reports a different regression. Hrs. worked refers
to number of hours a workers works normally, it does not refer to the number of hours in a reference week. Thus even if women are working part-time during the
length of the subsidy they might still report the otherwise full-time job. Subsidies, Labor income-employer and Total income refer to the total amount received last
month from the social security system, employer and in total, respectively. Individual controls include: Age, number of children, education dummies, marital status
dummies, region dummies, and ethnicity dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the year-month level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels.
This could be product of some mothers reporting half-time work during the
subsidy, or it could be a result of some mothers reducing their normal hours after
the utilization of the parental care subsidy. Given aggregate data of program take
up, this effect is likely bias downwards by mothers reporting their contractual work
hours and not their actual hours of work during the utilization of the subsidy.
Finally, the number of jobs mothers of infants hold does not change with the
policy.
Heterogeneity
Prior research suggests that disadvantaged mothers may be more responsive
to paid family leave than their more advantaged peers (Baker & Milligan 2008b;
Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, & Waldfogel 2013; Carneiro, Loken, & Salvanes 2015;
Stearns 2015; Lichtman-Sadot & Pillay Bell 2017). I study whether this is
also the case for Uruguay’s parental care subsidy by examining whether this
policy produces heterogeneous treatment effects according to several markers of
disadvantage, including: education, age, and whether the husband or partner lives
in the same home. Additionally, there is evidence that suggests that these effects
might differ according to birth order, thus I distinguish between mothers that have
one child and those that have more children at the time of the survey.
Table 4 shows point estimates, standard errors and pre-treatment means
for the Woman*After coefficient from equation (2.1) estimated using subsamples
according to individual’s characteristics mentioned. Column (1) presents the
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effects on overall employment, columns (2) to (4) present the effect by sectors and
column (5) shows the effect on “stay-at-home” mom. The effects of the parental
care subsidy on employment are the largest for women that have low-education.
The likelihood of employment of a mother of an infant that has not finished middle
school increased by 10 percent. This large effect is composed by an increase in
employment in both formal-private and public sectors. In particular, parental care
subsidy is associated with a 4.9 percentage point (30 percent), and 1.9 percentage
point (190 percent) increase in employment in formal-private and public sector
respectively. On the other hand, women with higher levels of education show
insignificant increases in employment and an increase in the likelihood of being a
“stay-at-home” mom of 1.7 percentage points (7.7 percent). Parental care subsidy
increases the likelihood of employment for older, married women, with more than
one child the most, as a result of large increases in formal employment and some
decreases (not always significant) in informal employment and “stay-at-home”
mom. Overall the heterogeneity analysis supports evidence from the literature that
paid flexibilities, in this case reduction of hours worked without wage loss, benefits
disadvantaged mothers the most.
Medium-run effects on maternal labor market outcomes
To understand whether the parental care subsidy’s effects are persistent, I
next examine the medium-run effects of the parental care subsidy on labor market




Employed Formal-Private Public Informal “Stay-at-home”
Low 0.036∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.003 0.009
Education (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016)
[0.35] [0.16] [ 0.01] [0.09] [0.46]
High 0.015 0.026 0.023∗ −0.015 0.017∗∗
Education (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008)
[0.65] [0.33] [0.14] [0.05] [0.22]
1 child 0.021 0.058∗∗ 0.021 −0.007 0.015
(0.019) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
[0.6] [0.32] [0.12] [0.05] [0.25]
2 or more 0.040∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.003 0.001
children (0.013) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
[0.5] [0.23] [0.08] [0.07] [0.34 ]
Age <30 0.027∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.010 0.0005 0.029∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
[0.42] [0.22] [0.05] [0.07] [0.36]
Age>30 0.045∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.024∗∗
(0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
[0.66] [0.32] [0.13] [0.06] [0.26]
Married 0.034∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.005
(0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
[0.54] [0.27] [0.11] [0.05] [0.34]
Single 0.073∗∗ 0.032 0.014 0.009 0.030
(0.029) (0.030) (0.013) (0.026) (0.018)
[0.52] [0.25] [0.05] [0.12] [0.22]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Pre-treatment means in brackets. The sample in each
row consists of individuals that share that characteristic. All coefficients come from different
regressions, where the dependent variable is denoted in the column’s name and the subsample
is indicated in the panel’s name. Regressions control for all other individual characteristics and
fixed effects in equation (2.1). Standard errors are clustered at the year-month level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Slightly more than 60 percent of mothers with a child that is 3 years
old or younger worked in the reference week. Table 5 summarizes the effect of
the parental care subsidy on medium-term employment outcomes. There is a
significant increase in employment on the extensive margin, between the pre-
and post-treatment periods, compared to untreated men. Overall employment
increases by 2.7 percent. This effect is driven by an increase in the likelihood of
being employed in the public sector, which increased by almost 18 percent from
a pre-treatment mean of 9 percent. It is worth mentioning that public sector job
arrangements are usually more stable, flexible and provide more benefits for the
worker and her family. Additionally, the results suggest a decrease in informal
employment, although not significant, and a significant decrease in the likelihood
of being a “stay-at-home” mom. These results point at the potential benefit of
this policy to foster paid work as well as increase the quality of jobs by increasing
formal employment among mothers of young children.
Next, I explore the effects of the parental care subsidy in the intensive
margin by looking at income, hours worked, job experience, and number of
jobs held by mothers of young children compared to untreated fathers of young
children, born before and after the implementation of the policy, conditional on




Medium-term effects of parental care subsidy on employment
Dependent variable:
Employed Formal Formal-Private Public Informal “Stay-at-home”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman*Post 0.017∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.012 0.016∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.011∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Mean 0.62 0.44 0.33 0.09 0.18 0.24
Time FE X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X
Observations 62,316 62,316 62,316 62,316 62,316 62,316
R2 0.185 0.200 0.095 0.078 0.065 0.154
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.198 0.092 0.075 0.062 0.151
Residual Std. Error 0.409 0.448 0.464 0.283 0.392 0.342
Notes: This table contains regression estimates where the treated group consists of all mothers whose youngest child is 1,
2 or 3 years old, and the control group are untreated fathers of young children (whose wife is unemployed, or employed
informally). None of these regressions are conditional on employment. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if a child in the family was born during or after 2014. Regressions control for all individual characteristics and fixed
effects in equation (2.1) and fixed effects for the age of youngest child in the family and their year of birth. Standard




Medium-term effects of parental care subsidy, DDD estimates
Dependent variable:
Subsidies Labor income-employer Total income Hrs. worked Job experience Number of jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post*Private 71.231∗ 4,107.106∗∗∗ 4,203.214∗∗∗ 1.800∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ −0.001
(39.356) (1,065.117) (1,074.996) (0.510) (0.175) (0.010)
Post*Woman 8.367 −214.544 876.898 2.954∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ −0.019∗
(15.007) (754.589) (762.124) (0.548) (0.142) (0.011)
Woman*Private 18.759 −673.979 −993.611∗∗ 4.270∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(18.851) (440.155) (433.974) (0.368) (0.120) (0.008)
Post*Woman −29.984 −526.412 −1,045.497 −2.139∗∗∗ −0.474∗∗ 0.022
*Private (44.126) (1,096.909) (1,106.518) (0.648) (0.188) (0.015)
Mean 109.92 16854.42 18067.87 38.1 4.3 1.12
Time FE X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X
Observations 44,468 44,468 44,468 44,468 44,468 44,468
R2 0.008 0.289 0.284 0.217 0.273 0.043
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.286 0.281 0.214 0.270 0.039
Residual Std. Error 981.730 18,545.560 18,570.240 13.933 4.430 0.356
Notes: This table contains regression estimates where the treated group consists of mothers of young children (1 to 3 years old) employed in the formal-private sector
and the control group are mothers of young children employed informally or in the public sector and employed fathers of young children. Each column reports a different
regression. Hrs. worked refers to number of hours a workers works normally, it does not refer to the number of hours in a reference week. Thus even if women are
working part-time during the length of the subsidy they might still report the otherwise full-time job. Subsidies, Labor income-employer and Total income refer to the
total amount received last month from the social security system, employer and in total, respectively. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a child in
the family was born during or after 2014. Regressions control for all individual characteristics and fixed effects in equation (2.3) and fixed effects for the age of youngest
child in the family and their year of birth. Standard errors are clustered at the year-month level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels.
Given that parents are eligible for the parental care subsidy only until the
child is 6 months old, there should not be any significant differences between
subsidies received by mothers and fathers, before and after the implementation
of the policy. Column (1) shows that this is case, which also supports the validity
of this variable as a proxy for policy take-up in the short-run. Moreover, there is
no significant change in total income for mothers of young children employed in
the private sector.
The DDD estimates indicate a significant decrease in hours worked, of
slightly more than 2 hours per week from for a pre-treatment mean of 38 hours,
and a reduction of job experience of almost half a year from a pre-treatment mean
of 4.3 years. A possible explanation for these findings is that the parental care
subsidy increases preferences for flexible job arrangements which induced some
mothers to switch from full-time work to part-time work. However, additional
research is needed to identify the exact pathways for the observed effects. Lastly,
there are no significant effects of the policy on the numbers of jobs held by
mothers of young children in the medium-run.
Robustness
A key assumption in a DD analysis is that in the absence of the parental
care subsidy the control group (untreated men) would have similar trends (but not
necessarily level) to the treated group (women), and that no other factors affecting
labor market outcomes occurred at the same time as the implementation of this
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new policy. To explore the validity of the design, I extend the DD analysis to an
“event-study” analysis. In practice, this means estimating equation (2.1) with year
effects interacted with the treatment indicator. I then plot the treatment effect by
year, which allows for visualization of pre-treatment trends and the evolution of
the average treatment effect in the post period. Figure 4 to 9 present these results.
Figure 4 shows parallel pre-treatment trends on employment as well as a
break in the trend in 2015 with a positive and (slightly) significant DD coefficients
after that. Analyzing each sector individually reveals different behaviors across
sectors. Figure 5 indicates parallel pre-treatment trends and increasing coefficients
in the post-treatment period, probably as a result of increased take-up as shown in
Figure 1.
FIGURE 4.
Effect of Parental Care Subsidy on Employment
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FIGURE 5.
Effect of Parental Care Subsidy on Formal Employment
FIGURE 6.
Effect of Parental Care Subsidy on Formal-Private Employment
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FIGURE 7.
Effect of Parental Care Subsidy on Formal-Public Employment
FIGURE 8.
Effect of Parental Care Subsidy on Informal Employment
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FIGURE 9.
Effect of Parental Care Subsidy on “Stay-at-home”
Figure 7, revels a different scenario for employment in the public sector.
There seems to be an positive pre-treatment trend where women with infants
were already increasing their likelihood of employment, and this trend seems to
stop after 2014. The result presented in table 2 is likely bias given the absence of
parallel trends. Lastly, Figure 8 shows overall no changes in informal employment
from 2009 to 2019.
Additionally, the identification assumption of the DD design would be
violated if the parental care subsidy induced selection into the sample through
impacts on fertility patterns. Ideally I would like to study whether women
employed in the private sector are more or less likely to have an additional child
as a result of the policy. Unfortunately the survey does not include information
on the history of employment of mothers, thus I do not observe the sector of
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employment at the time of previous births. However, I do observe the number of
children at the time of the survey and their age profile which allows me to address
this challenge.
To evaluate the plausibility of selection into or out of the sample of mothers
of infants as a result of changes in fertility I estimate regression (2) using
number of children as the outcome variable. If women employed in the formal-
private sector have more children as a result of the new subsidy, we should see
a positive and significant effect on the number of children. In other words, the
new born would be of higher birth order compared to those of mothers employed
in the public or informal sector. Figure 10 presents the estimated coefficient
disaggregated by year. Mothers of infants employed in the formal-private sector
do not have more children after the implementation of the PCS compared to
mothers of infants employed in public or informal sectors. Overall the effect is
small, negative and insignificant.
I then repeat the exercise using the medium-term sample of employed women
whose youngest child is 1, 2 or 3 years old. Figure 11 presents the estimated
coefficient disaggregated by year of birth of youngest child. Even though the
aggregated result is insignificant the event study plot shows that the introduction
of the policy is associated with a small increase in the number of children of
employed women in the formal sector compared with employed women in the
public or informal sector. In line with short term and medium-term results on
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FIGURE 10.
Association between PCS and birth order of infant
FIGURE 11.
Association between PCS and number of children
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employment, this suggests that the parental care subsidy made private sector
jobs more attractive for mothers of young children increasing their labor force
attachment.
Conclusions
I study the introduction of a novel form of family policy implemented in
Uruguay in 2014: A subsidy that allows parents employed in the formal-private
sector to work half-time while receiving full-time pay, from the time maternity
leave ends, and until the child is 6 month old. Even though both mother and
father can alternate access to the parental care subsidy, in practice, approximately
98 percent of beneficiaries at any given month are women, highlighting an extreme
gender gap in utilization, which has been documented in the literature for other
gender-neutral family leave policies.
In particular, I analyze the effect that this policy has on labor force
participation, labor income and hours worked for mothers of infants utilizing
household survey data in a difference-in-differences and triple-difference framework.
I find that mothers are more likely to be employed following the
implementation of the parental care subsidy in the short and medium-run.
Mothers are 6.1 percent more likely to be employed during the first year of their
child from a pre-treatment mean of 54 percent. This effect is driven by an increase
in the likelihood of being employed in the formal-private sector, especially by
disadvantaged mothers (those who are less educated). I study the effect that
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the parental care subsidy has on the intensive margin by looking at income, job
experience, and number of jobs, conditional on employment. For this, I leverage
the fact that public sector workers and informal workers do not have access to
the new subsidy and thus can serve as a control group within the sample of
employed mothers of infants. I find a large increase in subsidies received from
the government, consistent with program take-up, with no significant changes in
total income for mothers of infants employed in the formal-private sector after the
implementation of the policy.
In the medium-run, 1 to 3 years after the birth of a child, I find an increase
in the likelihood of employment for mothers. Moreover, mothers of a young child
born after the implementation of the policy and employed in the formal-private
sector decreased their hours worked by 5% without a significant decrease in
income.
Overall, this study provides novel evidence that extensions of flexibilities
after birth in the form of fully paid half-time employment causes higher labor
force attachment for female workers in the short and medium-run, especially for
disadvantaged mothers. The results are robust to changes in the specification
and to an extended “event–study” analysis which allows for visualization of pre-
treatment trends as well as the evolution of the average treatment effect in the
post period.
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This paper contribute to the literature on family policies in several ways.
First, the analysis of parental leave policies is largely focused on high-income
countries, and on the length of leave and who gets it. My paper pushes the
literature in a new direction by describing and evaluating a totally different kind
of policy. Expanding the scope of work on this topic increases our understanding
of the effects of different policy characteristics and can lead to policy innovation.
Second, I provide a causal examination of the short and medium-run effects of the
parental care subsidy on female labor market outcomes. This complements studies
that focus on take-up determinants and short-run effects of parental leave (Bartel
et al., 2018; Romero-Balsas, 2012; Tanaka & Waldfogel, 2007). Third, my work
has policy implications specially relevant for low and middle-income countries that
currently have low levels of parental leave and are specially interested in increasing
formal employment for women.
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CHAPTER III
EFFECT OF PAID PATERNITY LEAVE ON PATERNAL INVOLVEMENT
AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES
Introduction
Many countries have implemented parental leave entitlements reserved to
fathers and non-transferable to mothers such as paid paternity leave (PPL).1 These
reforms seek to increase paternal involvement in childrearing, advance gender
equality, and augment life satisfaction for fathers.
espite sustained increases in female labor force participation in recent
decades, women continue to be the main providers of unpaid care and housework.
Higher participation of men in unpaid work may allow women to spend more time
and effort in paid work, reducing gender inequalities in the labor market (Ray et
al., 2009; Rege and Solli, 2013). PPL reforms are also motivated by the idea that
active fathering improves child development (Fan and Chen, 2001; Shannon et
al., 2002; Jeynes, 2005; Lamb, 2010; El Nokali et al., 2010) and offers additional
benefits related to fathers’ health and well-being (Cools et al., 2015).
The nascent body of literature on the effects of PPL is unclear about the
effects of PPL on fathers’ involvement in childrearing, housework and participation
in the labor market. Moreover, the limited exciting literature focuses on high-
1See figure A.2 in the appendix for a visualization of current paternity leave regulations across
countries.
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income contexts that reserve a month or more paid leave for fathers, and is silent
on the effects of short-duration PPL in low and middle-income countries. In this
paper, I analyze the effect that the implementation of 2 to 3 weeks of PPL has
on fathers’ involvement in childrearing and labor market outcomes in Ecuador, a
middle-income county in South America.
Several studies have shown that the generosity of paternity leave policies
is correlated with the amount of time fathers spend childrearing (Boll et al.,
2014; Fuwa and Cohen, 2007). However, this literature focuses on high-income
countries and it is not clear that these findings apply to non high-income settings,
for a variety of reasons. First, parental leave policies in high-income countries
are often of longer duration and complement a larger set of family policies, such
as subsidized child-care and health care. However, in countries that lack a wide
support system for families with young children, the marginal benefit of paid
paternity leave may be more highly valued.
Second, the composition of families in low and middle-income countries often
differs by containing multiple generations in a single household. If, in addition to
the mother, the grandparents spend significant time caring for the children in the
family, fathers may not be as responsive to paternity leave as families in developed
countries where the alternative source of care is often a paid childcare center.
Third, labor markets in low and middle-income countries present two distinct
types of sectors; formal and informal. Formal workers enjoy the benefits of a
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social insurance package (pensions, health care, and other services) in exchange
for contributions, normally made by the employer and employee. Informal jobs,
on the other hand, refer to a variety of salaried and non-salaried jobs that do not
comply with social insurance, regulations, and taxes (Bosch and Schady, 2019). In
practice, only workers in the formal sector can access paternity leave. In Ecuador,
formal workers are more educated and earn more than informal workers. Thus,
PPL increases the gap in benefits between formal and informal sectors. On the
contrary, for high-income countries where family policies reach almost everyone,
paid leave favors low-income families the most.
My analysis addresses two broad questions. First, does the exposure to PPL
lead to higher paternal involvement in childrearing and housework in the long run?
Second, does PPL affect labor market outcomes for fathers? This paper explores
these questions while conducting the first causal analysis of the effect of PPL on
paternal involvement and labor market outcomes in a developing country.
Ecuador was one of the first Latin American countries that implemented
PPL. In January 2009, Ecuador passed a law that provided paid paternity leave for
workers in the public and private sector for 10 to 25 days. A father has the option
to take the fully paid leave from the date of birth of his child. This is a use-it or
lose-it benefit. According to the government announcement after passing the law,
the goal of this policy is to strengthen the paternal link to the family and promote
his integration to the family, based on a relationship of shared responsibility
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with the mother. PPL allows fathers to spend critical time in the hospital and
at home with the mother and newborn. Even though the policy provides just a
few days of leave, the special timing of these days could set a precedent for the
family dynamics and task divisions in the household that otherwise would be
determined by traditional gender roles. If fathers are present during the hospital
stay and early days at home, it is possible they will begin domestic routines that
will continue to influence child rearing well after paternal leave has expired.
Using data from the Ecuadorian National Employment Survey (2007-2013) I
employ a difference-in-differences (DID) design that compares fathers of children
born after 2009, to fathers of children born before 2009, who are employed in the
formal sector (treated), versus informal sector (not treated).
I estimate that fathers eligible for PPL increase time with their children by
24 minutes per week on average. This is an increase of 20 percent from an average
of 2 hours per week before the implementation of PPL. The largest gain is seen
among fathers who, pre-treatment, spend 1 hour per week child-rearing. When
treated, the time spent with children increases by 2 hours per week. The increase
in paternal involvement is driven by new fathers and public-sector employees,
depends on the gender of the child, and is highly heterogeneous across education
and income levels. This positive effect is higher for fathers of girls and is only
present for educated and high-income fathers. Overall, this study provides novel
evidence that PPL causes higher paternal involvement among educated and high-
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income fathers, suggesting that while fostering girls’ advancement, PPL may
increase existing inequalities in child-wellbeing. PPL does not lead to changes in
formal employment, number of hours worked, or participation in housework. The
results are robust to changes in the specification and the inclusion of individual
fixed effects.
My results extend the literature on family policies in several ways. First, I
provide a causal examination of the long-run effects of paternity leave on paternal
involvement by looking at the time fathers spend with their children up to 4
years after taking the leave. This complements studies that focus on take-up
determinants and short-term effects of parental leave (Bartel et al., 2018; Romero-
Balsas, 2012; Haas, 1990; Haas and Hwang, 2008; Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel,
2007; Tanaka and Waldfogel, 2007). Second, my research closely relates to Patnaik
(2019), which studies the implementation of “daddy quotas”specifically in Quebec,
Canada. However, I am able to analyze PPL implementation at the national level.
Third, this is the first study that explores the effect of PPL in the setting of a non-
OECD country.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides background on the policy
reform and literature on the effects of paid paternity leave. Section 3.3 describes
the data, Section 3.4 details the empirical methods used. Section 3.5 presents




Ecuador is one of several Latin American countries that have implemented
paid paternity leave. In January 2009 Ecuador passed a law that regulated
paternity leave for workers in the public and private sector. This law created
paid paternity leave for a total of 10 to 25 days. The father can take leave for 10
days if the birth is normal. In the case of a multiple birth or c-section the leave is
extended to 15 days. If the birth is premature or if there is need for special care
for the newborn due to sickness or incapacity the father is allowed to extend the
leave to 23 days. If the child was born with a terminal or irreversible illness the
father can take up to 25 days of leave. In the case of maternity death, the father is
allowed to take the remaining leave that would have corresponded to the mother.
The law also provides 15 days of leave for both parents in the case of adoption
from the day that the child is legally located with the family. PPL is available for
the father from the date of birth of his child and has to be taken continuously.
The leave is fully paid by the employer. Additionally, Ecuador offers 12 weeks of
paid maternity leave. This leave was not altered at the time that paternity leave
was implemented in 2009.
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Literature on the effects of paid paternity leave
Different theoretical frameworks have distinct predictions with respect
to the effect of PPL on labor market outcomes and intra-household child-care
divisions. The time-allocation theory, developed by economists under the human
capital theory, predicts that a household decides the most efficient combination
of time to allocate to paid work and non-market work, such as housework and
childcare (Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1977; Juster and Stafford, 1991). According to
this theory, the household will maximize their utility by having the wife take on
more of the household work when the wife’s income is less than the husband’s, or
the husband’s work hours are greater than the wife’s (Aldous et al., 1998). The
gender-ideology theory, more widely used in sociology and psychology, assumes
that gender norms are a major determinant of the assignment of work (Aldous
et al., 1998). This theory predicts that men with non-traditional gender role
attitudes are more likely to care for their children (Deutsch et al., 1993). Both
theories would predict that PPL affects paternal labor market outcomes and later
involvement by altering either fathers’ skill at taking care of the child or fathers’
sense of proper gender roles (O’Brien, 2004).
Leave take-up by fathers vary greatly across countries and is correlated with
the generosity of paternity leave policies (Boll et al., 2014; Fuwa and Cohen,
2007) which in turn are positively associated with gender egalitarian values
and preferences for more generous leave offerings (Li et al., 2021). Given these
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associations, it is no surprise that fathers who take more leave around the time
of birth of a child also share child care responsibilities more equally with mothers
throughout the child’s life (Haas, 1990; Haas and Hwang, 2008; Nepomnyaschy
and Waldfogel, 2007; Tanaka and Waldfogel, 2007). It is challenging, however,
to assess whether paternity leave policies cause higher paternal involvement, or
preferences for gender equality and egalitarian values are the root of both, more
generous policies, and higher involvement of fathers in childrearing and housework.
Several papers have explored these relationships by analyzing the effects of
new family policies in developed nations. An increasing body of literature supports
the notion that paid leave specifically assigned to fathers after the birth of a child
increases leave-taking. However, there is no consensus on how these policies affect
paternal involvement in childcare and labor market outcomes in the short and long
run.
Patnaik (2019) studies the implementation of “daddy quotas”in Quebec,
Canada, that increased benefits for all parents and reserved some weeks just for
fathers. She finds that fathers’ leave participation increased by 51 percentage
points and duration increased by 3.1 weeks reaching on average more than 5
weeks of leave after the introduction of this reform. She finds that exposed fathers
increase their time in housework by 25%, equivalent to 40 minutes per day, but do
not change the time they spend childrearing. Additionally, Fathers’ employment
is not affected by the reform. Ekberg, Eriksson and Friebel (2013) find similar
56
results in Sweden. They evaluate the introduction of a “daddy month”, which
reserved 1 month of the parental leave to the father. They find that the reform
is effective at increasing fathers’ leave taking by 15 days (around 50%). However,
they do not find evidence that fathers in the treatment group increase the time
they spend caring for children, measured as the proportion of leave taken to care
for sick children, or their long-term employment and wages.
Cools et al. (2015) analyze the introduction of a father quota in parental
leave in Norway and find that fathers’ take-up of parental leave improves children’s
school performance particularly in families where the father has higher education
than the mother, suggesting grater paternal involvement. They also find that
men’s earnings are not affected by leave-taking contradicting the findings of Rege
and Solli (2013) who analyze the same Norwegian reform and show that parental
leave reduces fathers’ earnings significantly. In the case of Germany, Tamm (2019)
shows that the introduction of two month of leave reserved for fathers (out of 14
months of family leave) increased the number of fathers taking leave by around
20 percent. He finds an increase in the time fathers dedicate to childcare (mostly
on weekends) and to housework and errands (on weekdays and weekends) which
persist even after fathers return from leave. However, he does not find any lasting
effects of the reform on fathers’ labor market outcomes.
The studies carried out in the context of Nordic countries, Germany
and Canada show the effects of generous family policies, which reserve one or
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more months of leave for fathers. These results may not apply to the context
of Ecuador or other low and middle-income countries that reserve just one or
two weeks of leave for fathers. In that sense, it is relevant to highlight a few
studies that analyze the introduction of less generous leave for fathers. Farré
and González (2019) show that the introduction of two weeks of paternity leave
in Spain increases fathers’ involvement in childrearing. Eligible fathers did
almost an hour more childcare per day compared with ineligible fathers 1 and
2 years after the child’s birth. They explain that this increase appears to come
not from reductions in housework or market work, but most likely, in leisure or
sleep. Fernández-Cornejo et al. (2016) also provides suggestive evidence that
paternity leave increased fathers’ childcare time in Spain, using survey data from
Madrid. Similarly, Romero-Balsas (2012) analyses the factors that foster the
use of paternity leave in Spain after the same reform and finds that the main
determinants for the use of PPL are having egalitarian roles related to child-care
and family oriented values.
In the United States were neither paid or unpaid paternity leave is provide
at the federal level. Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel (2007) find that the majority
of fathers take at least some leave at the birth of their child, but that the length
of that leave, although it varies greatly, is usually a week or less. They also find
that fathers who take longer leave are more involved in child care-taking activities
nine months later. In the case of California, the first state in the United States to
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provide paid family leave, Bartel et al. (2018), and Baum and Ruhm (2016) find
that paid family leave increases the number of days that fathers take from 1 week
to nearly 1.5 weeks on average. This increase is driven in equal parts by fathers
taking leave at the same time as the child’s mother and by fathers who take leave
on their own, while the mother is at work. Interestingly, to my knowledge, there
are no studies describing the effects of state level provision of paternity leave on
fathers’ involvement in childcare
My paper contributes to the literature on the effects of parental leave
entitlements reserved for fathers, by analyzing PPL of short duration, during the
first days of life of a child. Additionally, this is the first paper to analyze PPL
effects in the context of a non-OECD country. Given the mix results from previous
literature, plus the difference in the characteristics of the leave and context,
this paper is important to further understand whether PPL can advance gender
equality in unpaid work and promote early childhood development though more
involved fathers.
Data
The household and individual level data used in this study come from
Ecuador’s National Employment Survey (ENEMDU) for the years 2007-2013.
ENEMDU is a nationally representative household survey, conducted quarterly
by the census bureau of Ecuador, INEC. This survey interviews every member of
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the household, and any given household is interviewed during several but not all
quarters.2
Each individual is questioned about their labor market experience,
demographic factors, and use of time. This survey collects data on employment
status, hours worked, sector of employment (formal or informal), and household
characteristics.3
Importantly, the survey includes a section about time-use on housework
activities. It starts by asking whether the individual participates in housework,
if the response is ‘yes’, then the individual is asked about the number of hours per
week that they spend on different housework activities. This section also includes
questions to assess paternal involvement in child rearing. Specifically the question
is: “How many hours per week do you spend taking care of children, elderly
and sick in your home?” These data are unique because they provide insight
into how paternity leave affects future intra-household divisions of childrearing
responsibilities in addition to standard labor market outcomes. 4
Figure 12 shows that 70 percent of men of 18 to 60 years old that live with a
child do not participate in any childrearing activities, compared with 36 percent
2On average, the same household is interviewed during 3 or 4 quarters. This allows me to
create a panel dataset and include individual fixed effects in the specification for robustness.
3The formal sector is defined as the group of employed individuals who work for companies
of 10 or more employees and that are registered with the tax authority, the informal sector is
formed by self-employed and employed individuals working for informal employers.
4If the individual responds that he does not participate in housework then a zero is imputed
for hours childrearing and total housework. The number of hours dedicated to housework is




Density function of hours childrearing for men and women
Notes: Kernel density estimates of number of hours men and women spend childrearing per week.
Sample includes men and women between 18 and 60 years old that have a child in the home.
Source: INEC.
of women. This highlights the low levels of parental involvement among the
population.
The outcomes of interest are: a) whether the father participates in
housework, b) the number of hours per week spent childrearing, c) total number
of hours per week dedicated to housework, and d) number of hours worked.
There are two primary limitations to using ENEMDU data. First, fathers
can only be linked to children who live in the same household. Thus, the analysis
excludes fathers who do not live with their children. Assuming that non-resident
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fathers are less involved with their children than resident fathers, my results will
overstate the increase in paternal involvement as a result of PPL for the average
father (including those not living with their infants). Second, the ENEMDU lacks
precise information on child birth dates, only reporting the age of the child in
years.
The sample that I use to conduct the analysis is constructed in the following
way. First, I select employed fathers that have at least one child younger than
13 years old, and are ages 18-60. Second, using the age of the children living
in the household I identify parents who have at least one child born after 2009.
Third, I divide employed fathers according to their employment sector. Individuals
employed in the formal sector are treated, and individuals employed in the
informal sector serve as the control group in the DID design. The treated group is
formed by fathers who have a child born after 2009 and work in the formal sector,
and the control group is formed by fathers who work in the informal sector and
fathers who work in the formal sector but do not have children born after 2009.
Table 7 shows the mean and standard deviation of the outcome variables
and independent variables for treatment and control groups used in the DID
design. The treatment and control groups are similar to each other before the





Child born before 2009: Child born after 2009:
Mean SD Mean SD
Employed 0.893 0.309 0.911 0.285
Formal 0.494 0.479
Sample size 146995 39081
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Time-Use
Hours worked 48.50 14.81 42.99 14.87 47.26 12.59 42.48 13.22
Participates in housework? 0.667 0.471 0.618 0.486 0.663 0.473 0.611 0.488
Hours Childrearing 1.856 5.715 1.653 8.718 3.194 5.043 2.706 8.776
Total hours of housework 15.28 25.46 16.11 28.06 9.833 14.37 9.009 15.424
Individual Characteristics
Age of Youngest Child 5.862 3.505 5.883 3.521 1.060 1.103 1.007 1.111
Number of children 1.660 0.895 1.915 1.130 2.066 1.118 2.493 1.421
Married 0.552 0.497 0.427 0.495 0.489 0.500 0.404 0.491
Age 36.78 10.41 36.93 11.65 33.83 10.26 34.68 11.52
Ed: Primary 0.239 0.426 0.586 0.492 0.252 0.434 0.568 0.495
Ed: Secondary 0.456 0.498 0.362 0.481 0.489 0.500 0.385 0.487
Ed: Tertiary 0.305 0.460 0.0505 0.219 0.259 0.438 0.047 0.212
Elderly in the house 0.105 0.307 0.121 0.326 0.106 0.308 0.120 0.325
Sample size 64917 66312 17086 18516
Fathers working in the informal sector are less educated and less likely to
be married than those working in the informal sector. These differences have
potentially important implications for the analysis because, all else equal, more
educated and married fathers tend to spend more time childrearing. Hence, it
is important to control for these differences and I also analyze these subgroups
separately.
With respect to before and after trends, both formal and informal
workers show an increase in time childrearing but a decrease in the likelihood
of participating in housework, total hours of housework, and number of hours
worked. For the independent variables the biggest differences are in the age of
the youngest child and the number of children in the home. Fathers of a child
born after the implementation of PPL have a younger child and more children on
average. Given that these characteristics directly influence the time that parents
spend childrearing I control for them.
Empirical Approach
I study the effect that exposure to PPL has on paternal involvement and
labor market outcomes by leveraging the quasi-experiment provided by the
implementation of PPL in Ecuador in 2009. I leverage the fact that fathers
employed in the formal sector benefit from this labor law, while fathers employed
in the informal sector do not have access to labor benefits. Hence, I employ a
difference-in-difference design that compares fathers of children born after 2009, to
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fathers of children born before 2009, who are employed in the formal sector, versus
informal sector. In this DID design the treated group is formed by fathers who
have a child born after 2009 and work in the formal sector, and the control group
is formed by fathers who work in the informal sector and fathers who work in the
formal sector but do not have children born after 2009. This DID specification
allows for differential trends on paternal involvement across sectors and by age
of youngest child as long as the difference in the rate of change between fathers
of children born after 2009 and fathers of children born before 2009 employed in
the formal sector would have been the same as that of fathers employed in the
informal sector in the absence of PPL.
Under this assumption, I employ the following DID design to study the
causal effect of PPL on outcome Y for fathers,
Yit = β1Afterit + β2Formalit + β3After ∗ Formalit + β4Xit + γct + ηsy + ϵit (3.1)
where i is an individual and t represents a quarter-year. Yit is the outcome of
interest. I consider four main outcome variables: a) whether the father participates
in housework, b) number of hours per week that a father spends childrearing, c)
number of hours per week dedicated to all housework, and d) number of hours
worked. Afterit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if individual i
lives with a child born during or after 2009, and takes the value of zero otherwise.
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Formalit is a dummy variables that take the value of one if the individual is
employed in the formal sector at the time of the survey.5
The vector Xit includes a set of individual and household characteristics
such as age (in five years bins), education (primary, secondary, and tertiary),
marital status, ethnicity, age dummies for the youngest child in the household,
and dummies for the number of children. City-time (quarter-year) and sector-
year fixed effects are captured by γct and ηst respectively. Standard errors are
clustered at the city level (as a proxy for a labor market) to allow for correlation
within cities and provide standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. The coefficient of interest is β3, it captures the effect of PPL
on the outcome variable among individuals employed in the formal sector. To
interpret the DID coefficient as the causal effect of PPL on paternal involvement
and labor market outcomes, the implementation of the policy must be uncorrelated
with other time-varying determinants of time-use in the sample of employed
fathers. I provide support for this assumption in section 6.
The main hypothesis of this analysis is that even though PPL offers few
days of leave, the timing of these days is critical and thus facilitates routines at
the intra-household level that will remain well after the end of the leave. If these
5Because only age in years can be identified in the survey, a reported infant (younger than one
year old) in the second quarter of 2009 may have been born as early as April 2008, assuming that
births are approximately uniformly distributed throughout the year, only around 25% of surveyed
infants would have been born after the implementation of the policy in that quarter, compared
with 75% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Therefore, I treat 2009 quarter 4 as the first quarter of
the policy.
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routines are sticky we should see a bigger effect of PPL for fathers that were able
to access it during the birth of their first child. To test this hypothesis I employ a
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) design based on equation (3.1) where
the third difference indicates that fathers can access PPL for their first child. In
the following equation Firstit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the first child of the family was born after 2009. Given that fathers who had access
to PPL for their first child are a subset of all treated fathers, the interactions
After∗First and After∗Formal∗First are collinear to First and Formal∗First.
In the estimation I include the latter. I estimate the following specification:
Yit =β1Formalit + β2Afterit + β3Firstit + β4Formal ∗ Afterit+
β5Formal ∗ Firstit + β6Xit + γct + ηsy + ϵit
(3.2)
where i is an individual and t represents a quarter-year. β4 represents the
effect that PPL has on fathers that receive this benefit for their second or later
child, β5 represents the additional effect of the policy for fathers that receive PPL
for their first child. Thus, the effect of PPL on first time fathers is β4 + β5. Xit
and fixed effects are the same as described for equation (3.1).
Since both, the DID and DDD methods (equation (3.1) and (3.2)) leverage
variation in the exposure to PPL rather than actual participation, I estimate
intent-to-treat (ITT) which is preferable to estimates of treatment on the treated
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(TOT) for several reasons.6 First, TOT estimates could be subject to the same
bias from selection into treatment that previous cross-sectional studies have been
criticized for. Second, from a policy-making perspective ITT effects may be more
relevant as they allow for feedback effects, whereby the PPL could have changed
expectations and norms beyond the effects of actually using the leave option.
The implementation of PPL sent a strong public message about the importance of
paternal involvement in housework which may have incentivized fathers who were
exposed to PPL but not treated to nevertheless be more involved in the home.
However, it is safe to assume that feedback effects on parents who were exposed
but not treated are smaller than the first-order-effects on parents who took the
leave, such that the ITT results presented here underestimate the true causal effect
of paternity leave on those who take it.
Results
Table 8 presents the results from estimating equation (3.1) of the effect of
PPL on paternal involvement and hours worked. Column 1 shows that PPL has a
small but positive effect on the likelihood that a father participates in housework.
Column 2 indicates that the time fathers spend childrearing increases by 25
minutes. This estimate is statistically and economically significant, representing
6ITT refers to the average effect of the policy on everyone expose to it regardless of whether
they where treated, whereas OTT refers to the average effect of the policy for those that where
actually treated by it. This this case OTT would represent the effect of PPL for those fathers
that took the lave.
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an increase of 20 percent from an average of 2 hours for formal workers before
the implementation of PPL. Column 3 shows a small yet statistically significant
increase in the total time dedicated to housework that mostly corresponds to the
increase in time childrearing. Column 4 indicates that there is no effect of PPL
on hours worked. The increase in father involvement as a result of exposure to
PPL does not produce a decline in hours worked, indicating that fathers are not
substituting away from labor, but are probably substituting away from leisure
activities.
Table 9 presents the estimation of equation (3.2). This table supports one
possible mechanism through which PPL affects paternal involvement. Namely, the
routines established during the initial parenting experience are “sticky” and can
have lasting effects on paternal behavior. In fact, column 2 shows that the increase
in paternal involvement seen in table 8 is driven by new fathers. On average
fathers that have access to PPL for their first child, increase their time childrearing
by 37 minutes (equivalent to adding the two marginal effects β4 and β5), which
is a 30 percent increase from a 2 hours pre-treatment mean. This increase is
significantly larger than the effect of PPL for fathers who were exposed to PPL
for their second or later child, who increase time childrearing by 16 minutes. These
results support the hypothesis that intra household task-divisions are produced
early on and that they are persistent over time.
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TABLE 8.
Effect of PPL on time use of fathers
Dependent variable:
Participates Hours Total hours Hours
on housework childrearing of housework worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal −0.023∗∗∗ 0.100 −0.565∗∗∗ 3.950∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.072) (0.169) (0.335)
After −0.003 −0.249∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗ −0.082
(0.007) (0.055) (0.159) (0.210)
After_Formal 0.014∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.098
(0.008) (0.063) (0.166) (0.258)
Pre-t. Mean 0.677 2.051 20.85 49.58
Observations 166,831 166,825 166,827 166,831
R2 0.168 0.080 0.835 0.147
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.076 0.826 0.101
Residual Std. Error 0.449 4.143 10.180 14.916
Notes: OLS estimates from difference-in-differences regressions based on equation (3.1).
Participates on housework is an indicator equal to one if the respondent sends at least one
hour doing any type of housework and zero otherwise. Hours childrearing, total hours of
housework and hours worked are the self-reported number of hours in a week used for each
activity. Housework includes childrearing, cleaning, shooping, doing laundry, cooking, and
educating. Regressions include individual controls, time-city and sector-year fixed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the city level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
statistical signifficance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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TABLE 9.
Effect of PPL on fathers behavior - First child
Dependent variable:
Participates Hours Total hours Hours
in housework childrearing of housework worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal −0.014 −0.202∗∗∗ −0.583∗∗∗ 3.974∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.064) (0.167) (0.342)
After −0.003 −0.259∗∗∗ −0.245 −0.173
(0.008) (0.091) (0.165) (0.201)
First 0.004 0.082 −0.325∗∗ 0.281
(0.008) (0.081) (0.165) (0.260)
Formal_After 0.009 0.275∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗ 0.279
(0.008) (0.079) (0.178) (0.265)
Formal_First 0.013 0.340∗∗∗ 0.337 −0.521
(0.009) (0.113) (0.207) (0.331)
Pre-t. Mean 0.677 2.051 20.85 49.58
Observations 166,831 166,825 166,827 166,831
R2 0.168 0.154 0.835 0.147
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.109 0.826 0.101
Residual Std. Error 0.449 4.068 10.180 14.916
Notes: OLS estimates from difference-in-differences regressions based on equation (3.2).
Participates on housework is an indicator equal to one if the respondent sends at least one hour
doing any type of housework and zero otherwise. Hours childrearing, total hours of housework
and hours worked are the self-reported number of hours in a week used for each activity.
Housework includes childrearing, cleaning, shopping, doing laundry, cooking, and educating.
Regressions include individual controls, time-city and sector-year fixed effects. Standard errors
(in parentheses) allow for clustering at the city level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Next, I examine heterogeneity in the effect of PPL on paternal involvement
according to father characteristics. Each column in table 10 represents a different
regression where the dependent variable is the time, in hours, that a father spends
childrearing, and the sample varies according to father characteristics. Column
1 only includes fathers that participate in housework. Among these fathers the
effect of PPL is slightly larger in absolute terms compared with the average effect
when fathers that do not participate in housework are included. Columns 2 and 3
include fathers whose youngest child is a boy or a girl respectively. The effect of
PPL on childrearing depends on the gender of the child. Even tough both groups
have similar pre-treatment means the effect of PPL on time childrearing is higher
for fathers whose younger child is a girl. Suggesting that PPL can play a role in
fostering girl advancement.
Columns 4 and 5 in table 10 condition on being employed in the public
or private sector. The effect is significantly larger for public employees. This
is probably a result of larger take-up among public sector employees. When a
law is passed, public jobs are rapid to communicate, implement the changes and
provide employees with benefits whereas the private sector has may take longer





Heterogeneity of PPL effect on time spend childrearing
HW Gender Public Education Income
Yes Boy Girl Yes No Primary Secondary Tertiary Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Formal −0.136 −0.028 −0.088 0.414∗∗∗ −0.074 −0.308∗∗ −0.072 −0.150 −0.144 −0.239∗
(0.118) (0.121) (0.092) (0.148) (0.069) (0.121) (0.104) (0.294) (0.096) (0.130)
After −0.291∗∗ −0.201∗ −0.351∗∗∗ −0.103 −0.210∗∗ −0.102 −0.151 −0.088 −0.163∗ −0.435∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.113) (0.108) (0.084) (0.088) (0.093) (0.127) (0.366) (0.087) (0.138)
After* 0.452∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.061 0.238∗∗ −0.009 0.117 0.537∗∗∗
Formal (0.084) (0.102) (0.100) (0.151) (0.067) (0.104) (0.110) (0.297) (0.097) (0.090)
Pre-t. Mean 3.027 2.093 2.001 2.161 2.025 1.533 1.931 2.591 1.906 2.130
Ind. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 106,912 85,752 81,073 100,005 151,643 69,203 69,173 28,449 82,661 82,642
R2 0.222 0.198 0.203 0.180 0.155 0.208 0.209 0.251 0.194 0.196
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.116 0.117 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.117 0.131 0.107 0.126
Res. S.E. 4.641 4.095 4.005 4.064 4.037 3.772 4.026 4.667 4.035 4.054
Notes: OLS estimates from difference-in-differences regressions based on equation (3.1) where the dependent variable is the number of hours per week, that an
individual spends taking care of children, and the sample varies according to father characteristics. Column 1 includes fathers that participate in housework, columns
2 and 3 include fathers whose youngest child is a boy or a girl respectively, columns 4 and 5 condition on whether the individual had a public job. Columns 6-8
include fathers who have obtained some primary, secondary, or tertiary education and columns 9 and 10 divide fathers according to their income into low and high
brackets. Regressions include individual controls, time-city and sector-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the city level. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Columns 6-8 include fathers who have obtained some primary, secondary,
or tertiary education. The effect of PPL is only statistically significant for those
parents that have some level of secondary education. PPL has no effect on
individuals with the lowest and highest levels of education. Columns 9 and 10
divide fathers according to their income into the lowest and highest half of the
distribution. Only high income fathers present a positive and significant effect of
the policy on their time childrearing. Overall, this table provides evidence that
PPL causes higher paternal involvement among educated and high-income fathers,
suggesting that PPL may increase existing inequalities in child-wellbeing. This
result differs from studies in developed countries where the implementation of paid
leave benefits low-income families the most (Bartel et al., 2018; Nepomnyaschy and
Waldfogel, 2007). This could reflect differences in policy enforcement. It also could
reflect larger stigma associated to paternity leave among low-educated workers in
developing countries.
Several studies suggest that paternal involvement also depends on
maternal characteristics such as education and employment. To address possible
heterogeneous effects of exposure to PPL according to maternal characteristics
I estimate equation (3.1) restricting the sample according to mothers’ level of
education, employment status, and sector. Figure 13 plots the DID estimate
Formal_After for each regression. Education does not seem to be an important
determinant for PPL, however whether the mother has a job does play an
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important role in PPL effect. Paternal involvement increases by 25 minutes per
week as a result of PPL in households where the mother is employed, compared
with 15 minutes in household with a non-working mother. Both effects are
significantly different from zero but they are not statistically different from each
other. For those fathers whose partner or wife is employed, whether the job is
formal or informal does not seem to make a difference in the effect of PPL on
paternal involvement.
FIGURE 13.
Heterogeneity of PPL effect by mother characteristics
One question that may arise is, where in the distribution of paternal
involvement is the effect of PPL coming from? One possibility is that fathers who
were already involved in the care of their children might increase their time by
several hours from an already high pre-treatment mean. Another possible case is
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that the policy has a small but important effect on the majority of fathers and
not only on those already involved. Especially those that did not participate in
childrearing before the implementation of the policy. To shed light on this question
figure 14 presents the effect of PPL as seen in equation (3.1) but using a quantile
regression analysis.
Figure 14 suggests that the increase in paternal involvement is driven by
fathers at the lower end of the distribution of time. The largest gain from PPL is
seen among fathers who, pre-treatment, spend 1 hour per week childrearing. When
treated, the time they spend with children increases by 2 hours per week, a 200
percent increase. Fathers that do not spend any time childrearing do not benefit
from the policy and fathers in the top percentile of the distribution (that already
spend more than 10 hours childrearing) experience a small decrease. The dotted
line marks the average treatment effect presented in table 8.
Robustness
An important limitation of a DID analysis is that one must rely on an
assumption that outcomes in treatment and control groups would have followed
parallel trends in the absence of the policy reform. I perform a variety of
robustness tests that lend credibility to the identifying assumption.
This assumption would be violated if the PPL reform induced selection into
the sample through impacts on fathers’ employment status, sector, or fertility
patterns. Moreover, since I can only observe fathers who reside with their children
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FIGURE 14.
PPL effect on time childrearing - Quantile regression
in the data, I face a threat to the identification assumption if the policy influences
father–child cohabitation rates or if it is correlated with differential changes into
or out of the formal sector. To evaluate the plausibility of these concerns, table
11 presents results from regressions that estimate the DID model (equation (3.1))
using observable paternal characteristics as dependent variables (and omitting that
specific variable in Xit).
The results in columns 1 and 2 of table 11 show that having a child after
2009 does not significantly affect the probability of being employed or the sector
of employment, i.e. there is no selection into the formal sector. Given the short
duration of the leave (10 to 15 days), these findings are not surprising. Columns 3
and 5 show that PPL has a significant negative effect on the number of children
and the age of the father. This is consistent with the treatment group being
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younger than the control group as also shown in Table 7. The age of the father
and the number of children in the home are positively correlated with time spent
childrearing. Hence, if there is bias it will be biased toward zero.7 Column 4 and
6 show that PPL has no effect on the age of the youngest child of the family, or
marriage status. Overall, it is unlikely that differential demographic trends among
treated fathers drive the results shown in section 3.5.
Table 11 provides some evidence that fathers main observable characteristics
would have remained the same in the absence of PPL. However, even if this is
true, I also need to assume that fathers do not sort themselves into treatment
according to unobservable characteristics that affect paternal involvement and
labor market outcomes, such as preferences for children, ability, or work ethic.
Previous literature has addressed this concern by including individual fixed effects
(Currie and Walker, 2011).
Table 12 shows that the findings are similar if we add individual fixed effects
to equations (3.1) and (3.2). Individual fixed effects control for all observable and
unobservable characteristics that do not change over time and that may affect the
outcome of interest. The sample used for these estimations includes men that I
observe in the data more than once, and that at least in one of the observations
had a child in their home.





Correlation between PPL and paternal characteristics
Dependent variable:
Employed Formal Children Age Child Age Married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 0.007∗ 0.002 0.051∗ −5.177∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗ −0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.027) (0.037) (0.152) (0.006)
Formal −0.023 −0.115∗∗∗ −0.030 0.052∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.043) (0.247) (0.007)
After_Formal −0.204∗∗∗ 0.019 −0.602∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.021) (0.036) (0.152) (0.007)
Pre-treatment Mean 0.908 0.513 1.777 4.844 35.967 0.564
Observations 186,076 166,831 166,831 166,831 166,831 166,831
R2 0.209 0.320 0.303 0.506 0.261 0.328
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.283 0.266 0.480 0.222 0.292
Residual Std. Error 0.277 0.423 0.952 2.688 9.781 0.420
Notes: Each column represents a different regression with a different dependent variable. The dependent variable in columns 1-6 are:
Whether the father is employed at the time of the survey, whether he is employed in the formal sector, father’s age, marriage status,
number of children in the family, and age of the youngest child in the family. Column 1 includes all fathers in the sample, while columns
2-6 condition on employment at the time of the survey. All regressions include individual controls (except the dependent variable), and
city-time and sector-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the city level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
TABLE 12.
Effect of PPL on fathers behavior - Individual FE
Dependent variable:
Hours Participates in Total hours Hours
Childrearing Housework of housework worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Formal −0.016 −0.016 −0.002 0.030 5.198∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.122) (0.014) (0.334) (0.528)
After −0.136 −0.170 −0.007 −0.475 −0.516
(0.136) (0.129) (0.015) (0.316) (0.460)
First −0.079
(0.183)
After_Formal 0.237∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.015 0.497∗ 0.391
(0.133) (0.120) (0.013) (0.281) (0.417)
Formal_First 0.283
(0.202)
Pre-treatment Mean 1.767 1.767 0.682 20.825 49.316
Observations 146,317 146,317 146,323 146,319 146,323
R2 0.543 0.543 0.544 0.924 0.550
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.262 0.263 0.878 0.273
Residual Std. Error 3.523 3.523 0.410 8.991 13.721
Notes: Regressions include individual controls, time-city, sector-year, and individual fixed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the individual level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
The identifying variation for this specification comes from changes over time
in the number of children and exposure to PPL within fathers. Columns 1 and 2 of
table 12 show similar coefficients to the ones presented in tables 8 and 9. Column
1 shows an increase in time spent childrearing of 19 percent with respect to the
pre-treatment mean. Column 2 shows an increase of the same magnitude as seen
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before with a loss in power given that fathers that receive PPL for their first child
are younger than the rest of the fathers in the sample and thus I do not observe all
of these fathers more than once. Hence, fewer treated fathers are included in this
estimation than in the cross-sectional sample used for table 9. Columns 3, 4 and 5
show similar coefficients as table 8.
To asses the evolution of the effect of PPL Figure 15 plots the coefficient
estimate of Formal_First of equation (3.2) when I use the full sample period but I
vary the time of the policy introduction from 2005 until 2012. This represents the
additional effect of being exposed to PPL for the first-born child in the family.
FIGURE 15.
Evolution of PPL effect on paternal involvement
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The plot indicates a break in the trend in 2009 with a sustained increase of
the effect of the policy after that year. This increase in the effect can result from
an increase in PPL take-up.
Throughout the paper I have used time spent childrearing as the main
outcome of interest concerning paternal involvement. However, the ENEMDU
data also include questions about other categories of housework. Table 13 presents
the estimation of equation (3.1) when I use the remaining categories of housework
as dependent variable. Exposure to PPL does not have a significant effect on the
time that fathers spend shopping, fixing or washing clothes, or cooking. Column 2
and 6 shows an small but significant effect of PPL on time cleaning and educating.
Importantly, exposure to PPL has a negative effect on the time that father
spend helping children with school work. Even though this is a smaller decrease
than the increase in time childrearing it could indicate some substitution away
from older children to time with younger children in the home.
Conclusions
Many developing countries have implemented paid paternity leave (PPL)
with the goal of increasing paternal involvement in child-rearing and advancing
gender equality. However, little is known about how this labor law affects intra-




Effect of PPL on Fathers behavior - All housework categories
Dependent variable:
Participates Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Total
in housework Cleaning Shopping Clothing Cooking Educating Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Formal −0.023∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −0.080∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ 0.071∗ −0.565∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.037) (0.035) (0.028) (0.049) (0.042) (0.169)
After −0.003 −0.066∗∗ −0.012 −0.058∗∗∗ −0.060 0.129∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗
(0.007) (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) (0.041) (0.035) (0.159)
After* 0.014∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.001 0.049∗ 0.091∗ −0.137∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
Formal (0.008) (0.032) (0.024) (0.026) (0.048) (0.036) (0.166)
Observations 166,831 166,827 166,826 166,827 166,827 166,826 166,827
R2 0.168 0.143 0.185 0.122 0.110 0.140 0.835
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.097 0.142 0.075 0.062 0.094 0.826
Residual S.E. 0.449 2.180 1.613 1.543 3.051 2.263 10.180
Notes: Regressions include individual controls, time-city, and sector-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering
at the city level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
I leverage the quasi-experiment provided by the implementation of PPL in
Ecuador in 2009 to identify the effect that it has on paternal involvement and
labor market outcomes. This is the first paper to study the effect of PPL in a
developing country. I use data from the Ecuadorian National Employment Survey
(2007-2013) to employ a generalized difference-in-differences design that compares
fathers of children born after 2009, to fathers of children born before 2009, who are
employed in the formal sector (treated), versus informal sector (not treated).
I estimate that fathers eligible for PPL increase time with their children
by 24 minutes per week on average. This is an increase of 20 percent from an
average of almost 2 hours per week before the implementation of PPL. The largest
gain is seen among fathers who, pre-treatment, spend 1 hour per week child-
rearing. When treated, the time spent with children increases by 2 hours per week.
The increase in paternal involvement is driven by new fathers and public-sector
employees, depends on the gender of the child, and is highly heterogeneous across
education and income levels. This positive effect is higher for fathers of girls and is
only present for educated and high-income fathers.
Overall, this study provides novel evidence that exposure to PPL causes
higher paternal involvement among educated and high-income fathers, suggesting
that while fostering girls advancement, PPL may increase existing inequalities in
child-wellbeing. Further research is needed to establish which aspect of the policy
implementation can be improved to benefit low-income families and their children.
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CHAPTER IV
BANKING THE GROUP: IMPACT OF CREDIT AND LINKAGES AMONG
UGANDAN SAVINGS GROUPS
Introduction
Credit is an important yet often missing element in the production process
in low income countries. Farmers need credit to make investments, confront
a cyclical earnings cycle, and smooth out unexpected income or consumption
shocks. Microentrepreneurs also confront cyclical demand and the need to make
relatively large investments in stock or machinery. Despite such needs, many
rural communities are often underserved by financial institutions, including
microfinance. Traditional lending models, including microfinance, rely on
individual or joint liability contracts which generally have strict rules on selection
and repayments, and are not very common in rural parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
In this study, we seek to better understand the impact of delegated credit,
delivered by a commercial bank to a savings group rather than an individual.
Savings groups already provide financial intermediation to millions of households
in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa (Allen and Panetta, 2010, Karlan et. al.
2017), but remain largely disconnected from formal credit markets. With delegated
credit, which is better known as “linkage credit”, the bank offers a loan with
specific terms (interest rates and repayment plans), and savings groups on-lend
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the external credit to members, using the (generally more flexible) terms of credit
that are prevalent in that group. Repayments to the bank are generated through
savings accumulation and repayment of internal loans, and are not tied directly to
those who (indirectly) borrowed from the bank.
To understand the impact of this novel type of finance, we randomly
introduced a delegated credit product to existing savings groups in five districts
in Uganda. Together with a complementary savings account, loans are provided
to the group as a whole, and not to any single individual. In this paper, we show
how credit linkage generates new internal lending, and then report on the extent
to which savings groups participants benefit from delegated bank credit. The
potential expansion of credit operates through a very specific credit rationing
channel: the bank provides additional funds to the group, and the group uses those
funds to provide credit to members. Note that groups already provided loans to
members; moreover, while the interest rate charged by the bank generally differs
from the interest rate charged internally by the group to its members, this internal
rate is unaffected by the additional funds. In other words, the product increases
the quantity of credit, but not its price.
In addition to the expansion of credit, the adoption of formal financial
products is likely to impact the groups through a number of other channels. First,
the associated savings account allows groups to store excess funds in a safe place,
and thus reduce the need to over-lend at the end of each cycle and the ability to
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lend money saved in the bank (if this is not easily accessible to members). Second,
the intervention provided a great deal of personal contact with bank agents,
thus improving the information available to members about the banking system.
We expect that this might generate spillovers from group accounts to individual
accounts. Finally, we expect that the program changes the incentives to join and
remain in a treated group. For instance, these groups may become more attractive
to households seeking larger loans, or less attractive to savers who face reductions
in returns to their savings.
Our study, started in 2015, provided training and facilitated access to these
formal financial products through 2016. Our data collection effort took place in
February-March 2018, less than two years after the intervention. By the end of
the implementation period, two thirds of the targeted groups had submitted a
loan request, and one third had received a loan from the bank. We find high rates
of pass-through of the loan: internal loans to members are four times higher in
the week of the bank loan receipt relative to the expected amount; the increase
is around 1 million shillings, or 40% of the average first-time bank loan (2.3
million shillings). We find that the internal loans generated are not larger in
size; thus, the increase in lending comes from an increase in the number of loans
generated. Despite evidence that internal lending amounts increased in a sustained
way, a majority of groups stopped borrowing from the bank after the initial loan
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allocation, suggesting that the benefits from the program were not sufficient to
overcome the costs of continued engagement.
In terms of welfare impacts, in the short run, the intervention raised financial
resources available to members, lowered rates of food insecurity; however, the
relatively sizable increase in household income does not raise to the level of
statistical significance. Moreover, all benefits wore off by the end of the study.
On household production, we find fewer households investing in agriculture, and
statistically insignificant increases in enterprise sizes (as measured by revenues and
costs) as well as profits. As for the other outcomes, point estimates are larger at
midline.
These moderate effects are modulated by the finding that groups exposed to
the treatment suffered from higher rates of member dropout. This is the result of
increased churn within groups, and not of increased group mortality. After three
years, the gap in dropout rates between treated and control groups is somewhat
smaller and becomes statistically insignificant, indicating some catching up by
control groups.
The findings are consistent with the idea that linkage helps relax liquidity
constraints in the group, but the average benefit from linkage do not appear to
be sufficiently high to cover the significant recurrent costs. The muted impacts
on investments are also consistent with a broader literature that finds small
average impacts from microfinance interventions (Banerjee et. al. 2015), which
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is puzzling given that investment returns appear to be high in rural areas among
credit borrowers (Beaman et. al. 2014). The fact that external credit generated
changes in group membership is consistent with other experiments of delegated
credit (Maitra et. al. 2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4
provide information on financial linkages, in Uganda and elsewhere; details on the
accounts offered in our study; an explanation of the structure of the intervention;
a discussion of study timeline and instruments. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 discussed the
estimation strategy adopted and report the results. Section 4.7 concludes.
Background information
Savings Groups
Savings groups are community-based financial institutions, whose members
save on a weekly basis, are able to accumulate those savings through a storage
technology (typically, a savings box), and use those accumulated savings to
generate interest bearing loans to members. Thus, savings groups provide a
degree of financial intermediation in the community. Consistent with groups
matching savers and borrowers, Cassidy and Fafchamps (2015) show that there
is negative assortative matching along time consistency. A number of impact
evaluation studies found that the introduction of savings groups improves food
security, overall consumption smoothing, livestock holding, household business
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outcomes and women’s empowerment(Ksoll, Lilleør, Lønborg, and Rasmussen,
2015, Beaman, Karlan, and Thuysbaert, 2014, Gash and Odell, 2013, Karlan,
Savonitto, Thuysbaert, and Udry, 2017); however, these welfare impacts are quite
muted, raising the question of why the increase in financial intermediation created
by savings groups does not improve outcomes.
Savings groups are quickly becoming common in both rural and urban areas
of Uganda and elsewhere. According to the latest Finscope figures, almost half of
households in Uganda belong to one (FinScope, 2018).
Financial Linkage
Formal banking products that are targeted specifically to savings group are
called linkage products. Banks may offer a group savings account, which can be
used by the group to store excess funds. Group savings account protect savings
from theft or misuse; however, they also raise the cost of accessing the group’s
liquidity, as accessing the funds may involve time and travel to a bank branch of
mobile money operator. A second product, and the focus of this paper, is a bank
loan, offered to the group. The bank loan raises the liquidity of the group, and
allows more internal loans to be generated and issued. According to the State
of linkage report, as of 2016 25 banking institutions in 27 sub-Saharan countries
offered some type of linkage product to groups. In Uganda, where savings groups
are particularly prevalent, at the time of the intervention there were six different
financial institutions offering these products.
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It is important to explain how these two products integrate with the daily
operations of the savings group. Savings account provide an alternative location
to members’ funds. They are safer than a lock-box, and thus should alleviate
the fear of losing funds to theft. On the other hand, because funds in savings
accounts are less liquid, accounts may discourage internal lending. The loan
product increases the funds available to the group for internal lending; note that
the interest rate charged by the bank is lower than the rate charged internally by
the group (that rate varies from a minimum of 3% per month to 10% per month),
and that internal loans generated by the bank loan are priced at the internal rate.
The Opportunity Bank product
We study a linkage product offered by Opportunity Bank Uganda LTD.
(OB) and marketed around the country concurrently with the study. Bank
loans range between one and 20 million UGX and carry a monthly interest of
2.75%. Repayment periods vary from three to nine months. The initial loan was
always limited to no more than five million UGX, with a three month repayment
period. Issued loans are given to the group and not to any one individual, and
are used to generate internal loans to members who borrow using the internal
rates. Groups repay the bank on a monthly basis, either via cash payments to a
bank representative, or through the mobile network or bank branch. Crucially,
and unlike more standard microfinance interventions, repayments to the bank are
generated through the cashflow of the group, i.e., from savings and internal loan
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repayments. These cash flows do not need to coincide with the repayments issued
by those members who borrowed from the bank’s funds.
The process of linking the group to Opportunity Bank is not straightforward.
First, groups must be formally registered with local authorities (at the parish
level). Usually, registration requires completing a registration form and obtaining
signatures from community representatives. Second, groups need to have a (free)
group savings account, held at an OB branch. The bank uses the account to
manage loan deposit and payments, but groups can also use it to store excess
savings. Third, financial regulations require borrowing groups to have financial
identification cards, issued by the Government of Uganda. To meet these
regulations, three representatives of the group complete a financial card request
under their name; deposit a biometric reading of the fingers; and pay a one-time
fee of UGX 15,000 (USD 5) each. These actions require a visit to the branch1.
Fourth, groups complete a loan application form, which include an extensive set of
documents. Finally, branch managers take two weeks or longer to decide whether
to approve the loan request. Approved loans are then deposited into the group’s
group saving account, after a number of banking fees and duties totaling UGX
120,000 (USD 35) have been subtracted from the loan.
As the above makes clear, while there are significant one-time learning
and financial costs involved in linkage, groups also face large recurring costs
1The creation of financial cards turned out to be very time consuming; biometric readers often
failed to recognize all ten fingers, took hours to complete, and often were unsuccessful.
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in maintaining these linkages. Secondly, linked groups gain access to a savings
product, in addition to the bank loan. Part of the way groups respond to linkage
may thus be mediated through the acquisition of this savings account. To account
for this, our intervention will attempt to separate the effect of savings from those
of credit.
The intervention
Our intervention is registered under AEACTR-0003613 and took place in
five districts of Central Uganda: Buikwe, Luweero, Nakaseke, Nakasongola, and
Wakiso. In each district, we partnered with one of two local NGOs, READ Uganda
and Project SCORE, to enroll savings groups in the study and provide support to
the research team. These NGOs were chosen due to their focus on savings group
formation, their active and ongoing support to groups they formed, and their
ability to intermediate between groups, research teams, and representatives of the
commercial bank.
Groups enrolled in the study were assigned to one of three treatment arms: a
control group, a “savings only” intervention, and a “savings + loan” intervention.
Groups assigned to one or both financial products received an intervention package
that consisted in a number of activities aimed at lowering the implicit and explicit
costs of linking to the bank. Groups received numerous visits from NGO and
bank representatives, during which the group was able to learn about the linkage
process, the terms of the products, and the requirements needed to successfully
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obtain a financial product. The study also facilitated the formal registration of the
savings group within local authorities, and helped filling out the applications for
the savings accounts and loans. To further reduce transaction costs, the research
team paid the one-time fees associated with the financial cards. The overall
intervention, spread over a period of months, was very intensive, went beyond the
standard engagement of commercial banks, and was not cost effective.
One noteworthy difficulty in organizing this linkage product is that the
bank branch managing the intervention was located 60 to 100 km away from
study communities. To reduce the substantial transaction costs associated with
managing the savings and loan accounts, groups had the ability to administer some
transactions remotely, through mobile money. In addition, on occasion an OB
mobile branch (located inside an armored truck) visited the study communities to
carry out banking transactions.
Study timeline
In late 2014 and early 2015, a research team representative visited
approximately 300 VSLAs in five Central Region districts served by READ
Uganda and SCORE program in order to screen groups based on their overall
capacity and performance. The screening tool employed was developed by CARE
to help commercial banks identify groups that could benefit from formal bank
linkages, and was considered state of the art at the time of the study. Groups that
were enrolled in the study scored sufficiently high in the questionnaire, and were
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thus highly likely to be considered acceptable by the commercial bank. In total,
156 groups were selected for the study, and randomized into the three treatment
arms. To avoid cross-treatment spillovers, treatment assignment was done at the
level of the village.2
In February-April 2015, baseline interviews were carried out in all study
groups. For each group, 15 respondents were selected for the baseline. The
intervention phase was slated to begin immediately after randomization.
However, a series of delays caused by the speed of governmental approvals and
commercialization of the product pushed the start date well past the baseline
and into early 2016. At that time, the commercial bank hired a field agent solely
devoted to marketing the product to savings groups in the study and helping the
groups navigate the linkage process.
The active intervention period lasted one year and ended in December 2016.
After that date, the bank field agent was relocated to a different branch and
support activities to study groups ended. To measure impacts, the research team
collected midline surveys in February-April of 2018, and the endline survey one
year later, between February and April of 2019.
2Because not all groups in a village participated in the study, villages assigned to the loan
treatment will generally have groups where linkage did not take place. Groups in study villages
might not have been part of the study for a variety of reasons, including: failure to score
sufficiently high in the screening tools; not being supported by the SCORE or READ; refusal
to participate in the study; refusal to being screened; were not in session at the time of the
screening.
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It is important to highlight that the product became available in all OB
branches at the start of our intervention in 2015, potentially leading to program
spillovers. However, the company introduced it in the areas under study in a
controlled way, and was not allowed to market other individual products to savings
groups members during the intervention period. Indeed, OB followed the protocol
closely and there is no evidence of program spillovers in our study areas.
Data
Data for the study comes from a variety of sources. Our main results
originate from three rounds of household surveys, carried out at baseline (in
2015), midline (in 2018) and endline (2019); since the intervention took place
in 2016, these surveys allow us to measure the impacts of the intervention after
two and three years. Surveys included primary outcomes of interest: self reported
amount of savings and loans, participation status with savings groups, satisfaction
with the group; household assets, earnings, and investments. The sample at
midline and endline included all those who were interviewed at baseline. At
endline, we also interviewed all other current members of the study groups. To
create tracking sheets for this exercise, between December 2018 and January
2019 a small team visited all groups and took pictures of the current participant
rosters. We then identified those that had not yet been interviewed by their name.
New interviewees thus consisted of long-time members (that is, those who were
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members in 2015 but were not randomly selected for inclusion in the panel sample)
and newcomers, who joined the group at some point between 2016 and 2019.
In addition to the interview sample, our analysis incorporates information
from a variety of other sources. We received information on group loans offered
in the study area from Opportunity Bank; these include issuance and repayment
dates plus loan amounts of all loans to study groups for the year 2016 and 2017. In
2019 we also photographed and digitized loan ledger books belonging to most (but
not all) of the study groups. The loan groups provide information on internal loans
generated, including the issuance date and loan amounts.
Summary statistics Table 14 provide summary statistics and balance tests
from the panel sample, comparing the loan group against the control. The top
panel reports average respondent characteristics at baseline. Two thirds of group
participants are women, and the average years of education is 2.8. As expected
from the mostly rural location of the study, approximately 70% of households
are engaged in agriculture. Members are financially active within VSLAs: 82%
borrowed at least once in the previous cycle. However, as only 3% of households
reported having a loan from a formal lender, the sample is not accustomed to
working with the formal financial sector. Characteristics are well balanced between
the two treatment arms.
The bottom panel of the table reports summary statistics of the variables




Control Loans (1) vs. (2)
p-value
Members characteristics (baseline)
Age 38.485 39.103 0.569
Female 0.780 0.760 0.531
Schooling 2.865 2.900 0.755
Married 0.693 0.688 0.876
Size of household 5.130 4.861 0.169
Fraction farming 0.753 0.690 0.171
Fraction business 0.315 0.273 0.187
Food security index 0.642 0.696 0.381
Satisfaction with group index 0.008 -0.009 0.175
Formal loans 0.029 0.029 0.998
VSLA loans 0.822 0.798 0.425
Screening tool components
Overall score 76.417 75.316 0.581
Group maturity 0.600 0.579 0.819
Savings volume 2.583 2.474 0.431
Attendance 1.467 1.632 0.242
Portfolio at risk 2.167 1.544 0.049**
Writeoffs 1.750 1.684 0.674
Lending frequency 3.517 5.281 0.539
Value of investments 18.717 23.035 0.539
Disciplined group 0.817 0.877 0.369
Good procedures 1.350 1.474 0.246
Group awareness 1.417 1.579 0.132
Good decisionmaking 0.817 0.895 0.235
High quality records 18.100 22.491 0.535
Number of groups 57 60
Top panel: summary statistics of individual level data from members interviewed in 2015 as part
of the baseline. P-values computed after clustering at the level of randomization (village level).




Summary statistics: individual loans
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
All groups (N=110)
Total loans per VSLA 137.45 93.74
Loan Amounts (UGX) UGX 348,827 UGX 542,338
In borrowing group 0.12 0.32
Number of loans per borrower 2.75 2.59
Value of loans issued by groups on a weekly basis. Information from loan ledgers.
groups: key measures of group performance –savings volumes, writeoffs, value of
investments–are similar across the two treatment arms. There is one variable that
is unbalanced and that is portfolio at risk. To account for any possible imbalance,
we will control for all baseline variables in this table in our regressions.
Table 15 reports the summary statistics of the sample of internal loans
collected from the group ledgers. We have information on 110 of the 145 groups;
on average, each group reported 140 loans over the period under consideration.
Loan Amounts indicates the average value of a loan, which is UGX 350,000.
The provision of credit within the savings group
In this section, we describe the take-up of the bank loan by treated groups,
and then show the extent to which the additional funds are on-lent to the
membership.
99
Borrowing from the bank
The intervention led to a significant take-up of the savings product, and
a more limited take-up of the loan product. By December 2017, our review of
treated groups indicated that over 75% of groups assigned to linkage ended up
opening a savings account with the bank. (Comparable figures are not available
for control groups, although some take-up was expected). Take-up of the loan
product was significantly lower. While over 65% of the groups formally requested
a loan from OB, only 36% ended up with one (figure 16). In addition, there was a
significant amount of abandonement of the linkage program between the first loan
and subsequent loans. As shown in figure 16, all groups that borrowed repaid their
initial loan, but 8.8% of treated groups (24% of the groups that took up a loan)
ended up repaying late. None of those groups received a subsequent loan. 28% of
groups assigned to the treatment borrowed and repaid the loan on time; 37% of
these borrowed again from OB, and all of those groups repaid their second loan on
time. By the end of our review period, in 2017, only 7% of treated groups had a
third loan. Thus, lack of timely repayment appears to be one of several reasons for
the lack of repeat borrowing.3
Overall, the intervention injected over 100 million UGX (approximately
$30,000) in the study areas as loans between 2016 and 2017. All groups received
between 1 and 5 million UGX during the first loan cycle. Among those receiving
3We have indication that a small subset of groups ended the linkage program and began to
borrow from other financial institutions.
100
FIGURE 16.












































Repaid on time & borrowed again Repaid on time & didn't borrow again
Didn't repay on time, didn't borrow again
Borrowing and repayment patterns by treated groups, separately for first and second OB loans.
The first loan is considered repaid on time if repaid within three months (92 days), or within 6
months (185 days) for the second loan. These data cover the period 2016-2017.
the second (third) loan, loan sizes varied from 3 to 5 million (5 to 10 million)
UGX.
Impact on internal lending
We next study the extent to which the external loan generated internal loans.





αjGroupLoang ×Weekjgt + δt + δg + εit, (4.1)
where LoanAmountsgt is the total value of internal loans given out in group
g during meeting week t; GroupLoang identifies groups that received the loan from
Opportunity Bank; Weekjgt is an indicator for week t for group g, which occurred
j weeks before or after the provision of the bank loan. The parameters are αj,
which identify deviations of internal lending from the expected amount j weeks
before/after the receipt of the bank loan. To control for seasonality and group
characteristics, the regression includes VSLA fixed effects and week-year fixed
effects; the estimation of parameters αj arises from the variation in the timing
of the receipt of the bank loan. Identification assumes that the timing of receipt is
random, and independent of internal loan demand shocks. This is quite reasonable,
as the actual delivery of the bank loan depended on when (busy) loan officers gave
final approval, and were thus not timed to internal needs. Moreover, if groups did
expect the bank loan to arrive, then we should see αj ̸= 0 for j < 0.
Figure 17 plots the coefficient estimates αj for the forty week period
surrounding the issuance of the bank loan. We can see that the amounts lent
increase substantially the week the group receives the funds from the bank. The
point estimate is close to one million shillings, which is four times as high as the
average amount lent (UGX 230,000) and is 40% of the UGX 2.3 million that linked
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groups received from the bank. The figure also shows that the amounts do not
increase substantially in the periods following the bank loan–the point estimates
are all statistically insignificant and close to zero until past the 12th week, which
corresponds to when the full bank loan is due for repayment. After the 12th week,
point estimates become slightly larger and marginally significant (at the 10 or 15%
levels), indicating possibly that the short-term cash infusion led to a slight increase
in overall lending once the loan was repaid. Crucially, the periods preceding the
bank loans are not characterized by low lending, indicating that, to the extent that
there is crowd out between internal and external loans, crowding out is not huge.
Table 16 shows the long-run effects of the bank loan on internal lending.
The table regresses LoanAmtgt on three indicators that take the value of 1 for
groups that were successfully linked to the bank, for three critical periods following
the bank linkage: at the time of the bank loan; during the three-month initial
repayment period; and all periods following the repayment period. As before, we
control for time factors common to all groups through week-year fixed effects, and
account for differences in group characteristics through savings groups fixed effects.
The table demonstrates more clearly the dynamics of internal lending. First,
lending expands immediately thanks to the bank loan. During the repayment
period, the group issues a “normal” amount of loans. Once the bank loan is repaid,
on average the group maintains a higher level of lending, which extends beyond
the cycle and into future cycles. Overall, linked groups issue between UGX 155,000
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FIGURE 17.
Pass through of the bank loan
Coefficient estimates of the interaction between Week j and bank loan indicators from equation
(4.1), where j = 0 corresponds to the week the group receives the bank loan. Results in UGX.
and UGX 177,000 more per week, which is between 57% and 71% more than the
average.
Groups that experienced an increase in overall lending volumes could achieve
this by increasing the number of loans given out or by increasing the size of loans.
In table 17, we study how individual loan amounts are changed by linkage. We
take advantage of the fact that loan records include the name of the borrower
to create a person-loan panel. Each observation is an individual loan issued by a
savings group, and the dependent variable is the average amount of the loan. The
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TABLE 16.
Weekly loan amounts after linkage
(1) (2) (3)
2016 only 2016 - 2017 2016 - 2018
Post ×:
first week 441,601** 448,776** 447,103**
(196,427) (196,531) (193,827)
repayment period 12,001 18,709 16,832
(38,307) (37,354) (37,658)
post repayment period 155,444** 177,494*** 165,562***
(76,313) (61,009) (58,506)
Observations 4,559 9,343 13,425
R-squared 0.143 0.130 0.113
Mean (control) 270168 248665 255455
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
independent variable of interest is Post, an indicator variable that identifies loans
that were issued after linkage.
Column 1 reports the result of a regression with VSLA, month and year
fixed effects. The coefficient estimate is negative, albeit statistically insignificant,
indicating that individual loan sizes did not increase with linkage on average.
It is however possible that there are heterogeneous effects of the loan: for
example, larger loan sizes for existing borrowers, and smaller loans among new
borrowers. Because we know the identity of the borrower, we can study this type
of heterogeneity. First, in column 2, we control for the members’ borrowing history
by adding loan number fixed effects. In column 3, we further control for borrower
characteristics by including borrower fixed effects. Coefficient estimates do not
change much, confirming that there are no borrower selection issues. Finally
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TABLE 17.
oans issued per week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Loan Loan Loan first later
VARIABLES Amount Amount Amount loans loans
Post -40,392 -39,336 -31,553 -34,697 -38,683
(46,333) (47,250) (43,747) (89,537) (53,331)
Observations 14,117 13,459 13,459 4,979 9,138
R-squared 0.112 0.119 0.488 0.107 0.124
VSLA f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and Month f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan num. f.e. No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower f.e. No No Yes No No
Mean (pre) 331264 331264 331264 331264 331264
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
columns 4 and 5 split the sample between first loans and later loans. Coefficient
estimates are very similar among both types of loans. Thus, the increase in credit
is driven by more frequent lending, and not by changes in loan sizes or borrower
characteristics.
Impact of linkage on members
In the previous section, we demonstrated that linkage changed the borrowing
patterns within linked savings groups. We next use household level surveys carried
out in 2018 and 2019 to study whether exposure to the linkage program impacted
living standards of members. In our analysis, we take advantage of the panel
feature of our data to use an intent-to-treat methodology that controls for baseline
characteristics. For each primary outcome, we run the following regression at the
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individual i in village v:
yiv = α0 + α1Linked_Loanv +Xivβ + ϵiv. (4.2)
The independent variable of interest is Loanv, which is an indicator for
household who participated in groups located in villages v that were assigned to
the loan intervention. All specifications include five district fixed effects and Xig, a
matrix of group and all household and randomization controls reported in table 14.
We also include the full set of employment sector indicators (not reported in the
table).
We run regression (4.2) on the midline and endline data separately, using the
panel sample. The estimated α1 will tell us the effect of assignment to a linkage
program on those who were targeted by the program.
To account for the fact that outcomes can be correlated at the group and
village level, we report standard errors that are clustered at the village level. In
addition, we control for the false discovery rate using the methods developed by
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). Since the correction leads to more conservative
confidence intervals, we report q-values only for coefficients that are statistically
significant without correction. We also report ITT results for the midline (after
two years) in panel A of each table, and for the endline (after three years) in panel
B. Discussion of panel C is left to section 4.6.
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Household savings and credit We begin with the effect of the intervention
on savings, credit, and some measure of credit rationing. Table 18 reports results
of regression (4.2), where the dependent variable is the amount saved in formal
savings accounts and VSLAs (column 1), amount borrowed across available sources
icluding VSLAs, banks, MFIs and moneylenders, (column 2), and whether the
person reported having had a loan denied by a formal lender (column 3). Due to
a coding error in our data collection tool at midline, the questionnaire did not
include savings and borrowing from all VSLAs, and thus the total savings and
credit amounts are available for the endline only. Point estimates for savings are
positive but insignificant, while for loans estimates are also positive (133,000 UGX,
or slightly less than $40) (p-value 0.151).
Table 19 disaggregates saving by type (VSLA vs. formal); estimates on
savings continue to be statistically insignificant. Table 20 disaggregates credit
by lender type. We see that VSLA credit is larger in groups assigned to the loan
linkage, by approximately 144,000 UGX (18% of the average borrowed amount in
the control group). Estimates from the other sources are statistically insignificant.
4 We also find no evidence that the intervention increased the likelihood of
having a savings or loan account (results not shown). Overall, these results
clearly show that there are no effects of linkage on external financial utilization.
Finally, shareout amounts were somewhat higher in the treated group (table
4It should be noted that the proportion of participants obtaining a loan from external sources
is very low–only 12% of the control sample did so, and only 2.6% obtained it from a bank. ITT





VARIABLES Total savings Total loans Credit Rationing
Panel B: Endline (panel sample)
ITT: OB loans 21,715 132,981 0.018
(63,393) (91,862) (0.015)
Observations 1,013 1,114 1,114
R-squared 0.123 0.085 0.036
Mean (control) 587439 919579 0.0310
Panel C: Endline (all group members)
ITT: OB loans 75,384* 129,318* 0.001
(45,330) (69,790) (0.008)
Observations 2,720 3,016 3,016
R-squared 0.036 0.023 0.007
Controls Yes Yes Yes
District f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Mean (control) 618391 1.005e+06 0.0358
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Total savings, total loans are in UGX (exchange rate: approximately 3,000 UGX per USD). Panel
A is not presented because Midline does not include targeted VSLA information so the results
are not comparable.
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21). This is broadly consistent with higher internal fund utilization rate, derived
from increased in credit without a change in savings observed in treated groups.
However, the estimates fail to achieve statistical significance.
TABLE 19.
Savings amounts by source
(1) (2)
VARIABLES VSLA savings Formal savings
Panel A: midline (panel sample)





Panel B: endline (panel sample)




Mean (control) 294181 158286
Panel C: endline (all group members)





District f.e. Yes Yes
Mean (control) 324594 158633
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 20.
Borrowing amounts by source
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES VSLA Bank MFI SACCO Moneylender
Panel A: midline (panel sample)
ITT: OB loans 80,241 9,723 -0.034 -0.026
(71,034) (23,523) (0.131) (0.060)
Observations 1,619 1,620 1,620 1,621
R-squared 0.029 0.009 0.025 0.030
Mean (control) 112485 49145 0.465 0.0687
Panel B: endline (panel sample)
ITT: OB loans 144,005** 24,736 72,257 0.001 -0.044
(71,596) (43,077) (106,394) (0.108) (0.047)
Observations 1,114 1,101 1,096 1,106 1,113
R-squared 0.107 0.039 0.012 0.028 0.023
Mean (control) 768924 41985 72244 0.316 0.102
Panel C: endline (all group members)
ITT: OB loans 115,690** -685 28,719 0.167** -0.051*
(55,785) (24,394) (37,964) (0.077) (0.026)
Observations 3,016 2,977 2,968 2,990 3,013
R-squared 0.035 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.008
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean (control) 814632 68758 78819 0.225 0.0660
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
There are few reports of SACCO and Moneylender loans, thus they have been transformed using
the inverse hyperbolic sine function. Midline results for column 1 is missing as the midline does






Panel B: endline (panel sample)




Mean (control) 1.028e+06 500687
Panel C: endline (all group members)





District f.e. Yes Yes
Mean (control) 1.108e+06 500263
The outcome variable in column 1 is the sum of all shareout amounts received by the household
at the end of the cycle of each group. The outcome variable in column 2 is the average shareout,
i.e., the total shareout divided by the number of groups the household belongs to. Shareout
amounts are computed in Ugandan shillings. Panel A is not presented because Midline does not
include targeted VSLA information. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Impacts on income, investments, and business outcomes We next
analyze the impacts on income (table 22), use and amounts of agricultural inputs
(table 23), and microenterprise outcomes (table 24). All results are noisy, and lack
statistical significance; point estimates are indicative of an increase in income, and
a shift away from agricultural investments towards microenterprise. At midline,
point estimates for income indicate that members assigned to the treatment had
15% higher income (p-value: 0.19), but these point estimates fall and become even
noisier at endline. On agricultural production, (table 23), there is a significant
reduction in the likelihood of use of agricultural inputs at endline (column 2),
with the effect being driven by nonlabor inputs. However, this result does not
survive the FDR correction, and the average amount spent on inputs remains
unchanged across the treatment arms. Finally, table 24 measures treatment effects
on enterprise development.
It should first be noted that all outcomes in the table are measured with
significant noise between one data collection round and the next, possibly
indicating a high amount of reporting bias. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that
none of the outcomes measured are statistically significant. The likelihood of
having an enterprise is 1 p.p higher in the treated group. When looking at those
firms with an enterprise, we see positive point estimates for profits (both computed
and self reported), costs, and revenues at midline. However, all estimates are very
noisy; moreover, the sample size is very small. At endline, point estimates for costs
113
remain as large as the midline, while revenues remain much smaller. Computed
profits are thus negative (albeit statistically insignificant). On the other hand, self-





Panel A: midline (panel sample)




Mean (control) 409083 4.909e+06
Panel B: endline (panel sample)




Mean (control) 769972 9.240e+06
Panel C: endline (all group members)





District f.e. Yes Yes
Mean (control) 828489 9.942e+06
Self reported income from all income sources reported from all members of the household.






VARIABLES cultivated inputs used inputs used
Panel A: midline (panel sample)
ITT: OB loans 0.097 -0.028 7,635
(0.227) (0.031) (27,246)
Observations 1,333 1,333 1,333
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.000
Mean (control) 2.500 0.786 235706
Panel B: endline (panel sample)
ITT: OB loans -0.027 -0.064**a -10,527
(0.229) (0.030) (25,874)
Observations 998 1,114 1,079
R-squared 0.029 0.119 0.080
Mean (control) 2.579 0.788 226071
Panel C: endline (all group members)
ITT: OB loans -0.067 -0.068**b -7,892
(0.134) (0.027) (14,605)
Observations 2,719 3,016 2,895
R-squared 0.053 0.030 0.015
Controls Yes Yes Yes
District f.e. Yes Yes Yes
Mean (control) 2.381 0.781 202986
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
aFDR q−val of 0.111. bFDR q−val of 0.039.





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Has Num Profits Self reported Costs Revenues
enterp. enterp. profits
Panel A: midline (panel sample)
Linkage 0.010 0.036 86,237 14,560 2,064,821 2,274,254
(0.028) (0.037) (1,483,479) (631,126) (1,919,119) (2,147,916)
N 1,333 1,333 283 283 283 283
R-squared 0.051 0.058 0.074 0.216 0.187 0.204
Mean (control) 0.197 0.249 689760 2.225e+06 7.010e+06 7.904e+06
Panel B: endline (panel sample)
Linkage 0.012 0.039 -412,086 1,152,635 2,547,035 1,105,871
(0.031) (0.051) (1,434,876) (756,837) (3,162,765) (2,928,614)
N 1,114 1,114 467 467 467 467
R-squared 0.059 0.066 0.080 0.125 0.135 0.128
Mean (control) 0.426 0.542 1.503e+06 2.595e+06 1.060e+07 1.330e+07
Panel C: endline (all group members)
Linkage 0.017 0.018 347,990 277,812 1,506,334 1,316,704
(0.018) (0.029) (765,431) (415,460) (2,416,706) (2,188,762)
N 3,016 3,016 1,269 1,269 1,269 1,269
R-squared 0.006 0.009 0.022 0.044 0.035 0.031
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean (control) 0.415 0.521 1.261e+06 3.050e+06 1.110e+07 1.340e+07
Regressions on revenues, costs and profits only on respondents with enterprises. Profits are
computed as revenues minus costs. Revenues, costs, and profits are winsorized at the top and
bottom 1%. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Impacts on food security Table 25 analyzes the effect of the intervention
on food insecurity. Food insecurity is measured from five questions, in increasing
order of severity. At midline, participants in treated groups report significantly
fewer instances of food insecurity, for all issues bar the most severe type. In total,
they report 0.25 fewer issues (column 6), i.e., 24% less than the control group. By
endline, these differences had shrunk to zero. In particular, the incidence of less
severe issues (issues 1 and 2) in the control group do not seem to change much
between the two rounds of data collection, while the incidence for the treated
group does increase after the first year. The gains from the intervention are short-
lived.
Participation and satisfaction with the group We finally analyze the effect
of the intervention on members’ experiences with the group. First, we analyze
whether the interventions caused differential attrition from the group. A priori,
the effect of the treatment is ambiguous. On one hand, improved access to safe
storage of funds and credit should reduce attrition (at least among borrowers). On
the other hand, external credit may reduce savings returns, which is detrimental
for savers. More generally, the decision to participate in a linkage program can be
controversial, given the low levels of trust in financial institutions by Ugandans.




Food Issues of Participants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 Issue 5 Total food
issues
Panel A: Midline (panel sample)
Linkage -0.079*** -0.063** -0.057** -0.036*** -0.010 -0.245***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.026) (0.011) (0.008) (0.069)
FDR q-val 0.001 0.042 0.042 0.003 0.241
Observations 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621
R-squared 0.077 0.084 0.057 0.038 0.026 0.087
Mean (control) 0.228 0.458 0.246 0.0656 0.0269 1.025
Panel B: Endline (panel sample)
Linkage 0.036 0.031 -0.028 -0.029* -0.011 -0.001
(0.027) (0.042) (0.031) (0.016) (0.012) (0.097)
FDR q-val 0.459 0.463 0.459 0.405 0.459
Observations 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114
R-squared 0.061 0.065 0.046 0.054 0.029 0.063
Mean (control) 0.238 0.470 0.326 0.0832 0.0522 1.170
Panel C: Endline (all group members)
Linkage 0.024 0.001 -0.010 -0.018 -0.001 -0.003
(0.020) (0.027) (0.024) (0.011) (0.006) (0.072)
Observations 3,016 3,016 3,016 3,016 3,016 3,016
R-squared 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.022 0.011 0.009
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean (control) 0.249 0.476 0.319 0.0733 0.0370 1.155
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 26 reports the result of a regression whose dependent variable is
whether the member reported not being a participant of the group. The loan
treatment is strongly associated with an increase in the likelihood of dropping
out at midline: the estimate in column 2 suggests a 8.4 percentage point increase
over the control group (19.3%), this represents an increase of 44% over the control
mean. The coefficient estimate for the savings only treatment is also positive and
large in magnitude, but is not statistically significant. One year later (at endline),
more group participants had left both treated and control groups; the proportion
leaving was slightly higher in the control group, and the differences between the
two are no longer statistically significant. Nonetheless, the 6.2 p.p. difference
is 24% of the control mean, which is large. Thus, the intervention changed the
composition of the group, but like much else these changes fade over time.5
To shed some light on this result, table 27 regresses a “group satisfaction
index” variable on our ITT regressions for the midline. On average, study
participants associated with the loan intervention report lower (by 0.1 standard
deviations) levels of satisfaction relative to control. Importantly, this lower
satisfaction comes entirely from the dropouts (column 3), while stayers’s
satisfaction is unaffected by treatment. While it is not possible to glean the causal
chain here, the result is suggestive that the intervention did lead to reductions in
overall satisfaction and exit from the group.
5It should be noted that this result is not driven by group mortality: none of the groups in
the treatment dismantled (and only two did in the control group).
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TABLE 26.
Participant dropped study savings group
(1) (2)







District f.e. Yes Yes
Mean (control) 0.193 0.268
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To understand whether this exit of members translates in smaller group
membership for treated groups we construct membership levels at the group
level. At endline groups exposed to the intervention are on average smaller than
control groups. Table 28 reports a reduction of about 4 members in treated group,
19% smaller membership than in control groups. Treatment not only seems to
accelerate the process of dropping out (as seen in table 26) but it also decreases
the number of new member that the group receives. Table 30 indicates that groups
exposed to treatment have on average 3 fewer new members, a 25% reduction with
respect to control groups.
Why are treated groups more likely to loose members and less likely to
receive new ones? One possible explanation is that being exposed to treatment
but not being able to successfully receive a group loan increases friction among
members, decreasing satisfaction, and leading some members to leave. To assess
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TABLE 27.
Index of satisfaction with group at midline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All All Dropouts Stayers
Linkage -0.087* -0.081 -0.161** -0.010
(0.050) (0.054) (0.079) (0.051)
Observations 1,358 1,358 369 989
R-squared 0.007 0.069 0.116 0.049
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
District f.e. No Yes Yes Yes
Mean (control) 0.0290 0.0290 -0.201 0.101
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 28.
Number of members of study savings group at endline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Membership
Treated -4.31*** -3.87** -4.73* -4.86**
(1.49) (1.67) (2.42) (2.36)
Pr(group loan) 1.46 14.34***
(3.45) (4.39)
Treated * Pr(group loan) 1.41 2.51
(4.32) (4.57)
Observations 117 117 117 117
R-squared 0.333 0.569 0.339 0.626
Controls No Yes No Yes
District f.e. No Yes No Yes
Mean (control) 19.80 19.80 19.80 19.80
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Membership is the number os participants that belong to the study VSLA at endline.
Pr(group loan) is the predicted probability of success accessing a group loan based on baseline
group characteristics picked by lasso lic(ebic) fitted in a probit model. SE are clustered at the
village level.
this possibility we used Lasso to predict the probability of a group successfully
receiving a group loan using baseline group characteristics. In tables 28-30 Treated
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TABLE 29.
Number of participants that dropped from study savings group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Dropout Dropout Dropout Dropout
Treated 0.56 1.03 1.41 2.16
(1.03) (1.06) (1.43) (1.39)
Pr(group loan) 0.99 -0.64
(1.77) (3.06)
Treated * Pr(group loan) -2.45 -3.31
(2.40) (3.04)
Observations 117 117 117 117
R-squared 0.003 0.395 0.010 0.407
Controls No Yes No Yes
District f.e. No Yes No Yes
Mean (control) 7.700 7.700 7.700 7.700
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dropout is the number of participants that belonged to the study VSLA at baseline and
dropped out from the group by endline. Pr(group loan) is the predicted probability of success
accessing a group loan based on baseline group characteristics picked by lasso lic(ebic) fitted in a
probit model. SE are clustered at the village level.
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TABLE 30.
Number of participants that joined study savings group
(1) (2) (3) (5)
VARIABLES Joiners Joiners Joiners Joiners
Treated -3.90*** -3.31** -3.44* -2.66
(1.27) (1.47) (2.01) (2.46)
Pr(group loan) 2.55 13.82**
(3.47) (5.41)
Treated * Pr(group loan) -1.08 -0.66
(4.17) (4.76)
Observations 117 117 117 117
R-squared 0.245 0.488 0.253 0.364
Controls No Yes No Yes
District f.e. No Yes No Yes
Mean (control) 13.28 13.28 13.28 13.28
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dropout is the number of participants that belonged to the study VSLA at baseline and
dropped out from the group by endline. Pr(group loan) is the predicted probability of success
accessing a group loan based on baseline group characteristics picked by lasso lic(ebic) fitted in a
probit model. SE are clustered at the village level.
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* Pr(group loan) indicates how treatment affects group composition for groups
with a high probability of receiving a group loan relative to those treated but
with a low probability of successfully receiving a group loan. Treatment affects
all groups similarly, there are no (significantly) different effects of treatment for
groups with high probability of receiving a group loan with respect to those with a
low probability of receiving a group while treated.
To better understand the effect of linkage on the average characteristics of
group members and what drives turnover, we look in more detail to the individual
characteristics of members that dropped out from an study VSLA with respect
to those who continued being members from baseline until endline. Table 31
reports demographic and financial characteristics for dropouts and stayers in
control groups. On average dropouts have significantly less children and smaller
households than stayers.
Column 5 presents the coefficients from a regression where the dependent
variable is Dropout =1 and all variables are included as controls. Group members
with larger amounts of savings in banks and MM, less amount of savings in
VSLAs, that do not have a loan from a VSLA, that have more valuable durable
household assets, and have less valuable lifestock, are more likely to leave the
group. Interestingly, those with larger amounts borrowed from VSLAs are also








(mean, C) (1) vs. (2) p-value
OLS regression:






Female 0.794 0.808 -0.014 0.683 -0.0177 0.0361
Age 43.676 44.400 -0.724 0.539 -0.0017 0.0014
Highest grade completed 2.971 2.910 0.060 0.622 0.0042 -0.0233
Married 0.598 0.641 -0.043 0.306 -0.0565 0.0789
Household size 6.137 6.910 -0.773 0.008 -0.0103 -0.0062
Number of children 3.791 4.318 -0.528 0.025 0.0033 0.0047
Financial (at baseline)
Farming 0.791 0.776 0.016 0.693 0.0768 -0.0545
Amount saved in VSLAs, banks, MM 2.052 1.930 0.122 0.798 0.0355** -0.0184
Has savings in VSLA 0.716 0.665 0.051 0.247 0.1098 -0.0043
Amount saved in VSLAs 1.492 1.520 -0.028 0.909 -0.0788** 0.0448
Amount borrowed from
bank, MFI and SACCOs 0.226 0.082 0.144 0.314 0.0102 -0.0103
Has loan from VSLA 0.809 0.861 -0.052 0.139 -0.1595** 0.1026
Amount borrowed from all VSLAs 3.899 3.374 0.525 0.237 0.0109** -0.0138*
Index of assets -0.030 -0.113 0.083 0.625 0.0130 -0.0306
Value of livestock assets 23.932 170.430 -146.498 0.246 -0.00003*** 0.0007***
Value of durable household assets 37.957 16.867 21.090 0.263 0.0001*** 0.0011*
Index of housing characteristics -0.010 -0.042 0.033 0.790 -0.0100 0.0290
Satisfaction index (at baseline) 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.844 0.0083 -0.1079
N 306 245 551 551 559 1,160
Notes: All variables are measured at the individual level. Savings, loans, and assets are measured in hundred of thousands of UGX. Columns 1-4 include individuals
in the control groups. Demographic characteristics are measured at endline but are believed to not change with treatment. Financial variables and satisfaction index
with group are measured at baseline. Column 3 includes mean differences. Column 4 includes the p-value associated with a joint orthogonality test on dropouts and
stayers. Column 5 includes the coefficients for each variable from a regression where the dependent variable is Dropout =1 and all variables are included as control.
Column 6 shows the results from regressing Dropout =1 on a treatment indicator, all control variables, and the interaction between treatment and control variables.
Each cell includes the coefficient on treatment interacted with that specific control variable. SE are clustered at the village level.
Column 6 in table 31 shows the results from regressing Dropout =1 on a
treatment indicator, all control variables, and the interaction between treatment
and control variables for a sample that includes all households from the panel
dataset. Treatment decreases the likelihood of dropping out of members that have
more or larger loans from VSLAs. However, treatment increases the likelihood
of dropping out by members that have more assets. Participants with a higher
asset index at baseline have larger savings in VSLAs (they have a correlation of
0.22). This suggests a differential effect of treatment according to whether the
individual is a net saver or net borrower, retaining net borrowers due to the higher
availability of founds and hampering net savers possibly because of reduced returns
on their savings.
Table 32 reports the decomposition of savings, loan, and assets at endline
according to treatment and whether the participant stayed in the baseline
VSLA until endline or dropped out. Dropouts not only have less savings and
loans in VSLAs (which is expected) but they are also less financial included in
general, they have lower total savings and loans than stayers. The coefficients
on the interaction between treatment and the dropout status indicates that
the intervention did not affect financial outcomes of dropouts, they are not




Decomposition of financial variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total savings Total loans VSLA savings VSLA loans Asset Index
Joiner 14,645 -2,384 -49,097 -27,359 0.027
(91,936) (86,490) (40,099) (71,815) (0.101)
Dropout -298,684*** -319,214*** -310,808*** -468,543*** -0.155
(85,863) (98,326) (48,666) (78,771) (0.117)
Loan * Joiner 387,906 -422,963 -10,907 -106,481 -0.149
(345,931) (350,066) (93,547) (114,365) (0.176)
Loan * Dropout -136,678 -433,400 -26,105 -35,146 -0.019
(181,610) (339,549) (97,566) (124,360) (0.185)
Loan 112,147 458,546 21,341 133,231 0.136
(175,111) (339,874) (100,477) (112,700) (0.179)
Constant 733,007*** 1,115,298*** 455,980*** 979,106*** 0.059
(95,468) (91,579) (51,742) (67,532) (0.114)
Observations 2,720 3,016 3,016 3,016 3,011
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.038 0.036 0.002
Mean (control) 655,667 1,024,766 345,238 834,699 0.0288
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: All variables are measured at the individual level at endline. SE are clustered at the village level.
Impact of linkage on the characteristics of the group
The discussion above indicates that exposure to linkage programs has muted
welfare impacts, but does cause an increase in turnover within savings groups.
If the new members who replace the leavers have characteristics that are very
different from those leavers, they could change the average characteristics of the
group. On average, groups that have undergone linkage could thus appear to be
different; it would however be incorrect to attribute the difference as a causal
effect of linkage of members. The potential for miss-attribution of impacts on
linkage is quite possible: anecdotes of groups improving after linkage abound
among the savings group community.
To better understand the effect of linkage on the average characteristics
of the group, we make use of the full endline sample. As mentioned in the
data section, at endline we interviewed all members that were active in 2018,
irrespective of whether they joined prior or after the intervention. We then used
these data to reconstruct all the (study) groups that a household belonged to
at endline, and created a dataset of household-by-group. For each household i
belonging to group g, we run the following regressions:
yig = α0 + α1Linked_Loang +Xigβ + ϵig. (4.3)
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Note that equation (4.3) differs from (4.2) in a number of ways. First,
the regression above allows for multiple observations for each household, if
households belong to multiple groups. Second, the assignment to the treatment,
Linked_Loan, is defined over the group that household i belongs to, and not
her village. For members that were present at baseline, we thus ignore their
initial assignment, and drop baseline observations that are no longer in a study
savings group in 2018. The estimated coefficient α1 thus indicates the difference in
outcome y between groups assigned to the linkage and control. The difference is a
weighted sum of two factors: the impact of linkage on stayers, and of the difference
in the characteristics of newcomers. Given that the first factor is estimated to be
close to zero for most outcomes, the coefficient estimate thus indicates the effect of
selection.
We revisit all outcomes reported in section 4.5. For simplicity, estimates
for equation (4.3) are reported in panel C of each table presented in the previous
section.
The results indicate that linkage does make groups appear better off–due to
the selection effects. Members of linked groups have higher savings and total loan
amounts (table 18), and gain from higher shareout amounts (table 21). On the
other hand, it terms of measured outcomes, coefficient estimates do not appear to
be significantly larger in treated groups relative to control. Income is higher (table
22) and standard errors are somewhat lower although results remain insignificant;
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the patterns for agricultural production is also similar to the endline panel sample.
On enterprise, coefficients for self reported and imputed profits are both positive
and relatively small. Rates of food insecurity are also indistinguishable between
treated and control groups.
Conclusion
In this study, we seek to better understand the impact of credit delivered
through savings groups. Our randomized control trial enhances financial
intermediation by introducing two formal banking products–a savings account
and a loan account– to existing savings groups in five districts in Uganda. he main
question we are interested in addressing is whether savings groups participants
benefit from an enhanced access to bank credit. The potential expansion of credit
operates through a very specific credit rationing channel: the bank provides
additional funds to the group, and the group uses those funds to provide credit
to members. After two years, we find that most (75%) treated groups opened the
account with the banking institution. Take-up of loans was considerably lower:
only one third of groups were able to successfully receive a loan from the bank.
Despite this, we observe a large increase of lending to members coinciding with the
bank loans, suggesting that the loan did generate new borrowing opportunities.
Our (preliminary and noisy) estimates suggest an increase of 13% in self-reported
income, and 17% increase in savings. We find some limited spillover effects on
personal use of loans from SACCOs, but these are limited to the savings only
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intervention arm. Finally, we find no effects on agricultural investments (we have
yet to analyze impacts on enterprise). We also find that groups exposed to the




My dissertation intersects the fields of labor, development and gender
economics while utilizing quasi-experimental and experimental techniques to
causally identify the effect of programs and public policy in the areas of paid
family leave (chapters II and III) and financial inclusion (chapter IV).
With only a few exceptions, countries around the world provide paid family
leave to increase female labor force participation, improve gender equality, and
foster family wellbeing. Yet, a large percentage of women do not return to work
after maternity leave. Can a policy that allows flexible reintroduction to work
increase labor force participation after childbirth? To answer this question, in
chapter II I study a unique subsidy implemented in Uruguay in 2014 that allows
mothers to work half-time while receiving full-time pay for four months after
maternity leave ends. I use eleven years of employment survey data in a difference-
in-differences and triple difference framework and find an increase in the likelihood
of employment of 17% for eligible mothers up to 1 year after childbirth, and a
decrease in hours worked of 5% without a significant reduction in income up
to 3 years after childbirth. These findings demonstrate that policies easing the
transition back from maternity leave can increase female labor force participation
and reduce “child-penalties” in the short and medium-run.
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In chapter III, I leverage the quasi-experiment provided by the
implementation of PPL in Ecuador in 2009 to identify the effect that it has on
paternal involvement in childrearing, housework, and labor market outcomes. I use
data from the Ecuadorian National Employment Survey (2007-2013) to employ
a generalized difference-in-differences design that compares fathers of children
born after 2009, to fathers of children born before 2009, who are employed in
the formal sector (treated), versus informal sector (not treated). I estimate that
fathers eligible for PPL increase time with their children by 24 minutes per week
on average without any changes in housework. This is an increase of 20 percent
from an average of almost 2 hours per week before the implementation of PPL.
These are sizable results, considering the short duration of the leave, driven by
changes in behaviors of those that receive PPL for their first-born child. PPL
does not affect fathers’ employment or hours work, suggesting that they substitute
leisure for time spend taking care of their children as a result of the reform.
In chapter IV, my coauthors and I study a lending model with the potential
to bridge the gap between formal and informal finance in the context of rural
communities in Uganda. In this delegated lending model, better known as linkage,
a formal financial institution lends to savings groups and lets the group decide
the allocation of borrowed funds. In our RCT, a random sample of existing
savings groups gained facilitated access to linkage loans from a commercial bank
in Uganda. We show that the bank loan stimulated an immediate and sizable
133
increase in internal lending, which is sustained over time. We find that members
of treated groups had temporarily lower rates of food insecurity after two years,
and point estimates suggest sizable increases in income and microenterprise size
(which are not statistically significant). However, groups assigned to treatment
also experienced significantly more turnover, suggesting that the possibility of
external financing generates powerful selection effects.
All together these chapters provide insights on specific policies that can
contribute to the empowerment and flourishing of women and their families by
increasing their access to financial products, promoting the reconciliation of work




MATERNITY AND PATERNITY LEAVE PROVISIONS ACROSS THE WORD
FIGURE A.1.
Maternity leave regulations across countries
Source: 2020 WORLD Policy Analysis Center
FIGURE A.2.
Paternity leave regulations across countries
Source: 2020 WORLD Policy Analysis Center
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